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This MBA Project analyzed the following four strategic issues surrounding 
Program Executive Office Missiles and Space: the implementation of Program 
Budget Decision 753, the deterioration of the matrix support structure, the aging of 
the civilian workforce, and the influx of new organizations resulting from the Base 
Realignment and Closure process. The goals of this project were to conduct an 
analysis of the interrelationships among several strategic problems and challenges 
facing PEO, Missiles and Space, to provide a scientific foundation from which 
alternatives can be drawn and to present a sound case analysis that can be used by 
PEO, Missiles and Space, the Army Acquisition community, and similar Department 
of Defense commands.  This project was conducted with the sponsorship and 
assistance of the Acquisition Research Program, Naval Postgraduate School and 
Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.   
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 Executive Summary 
In April of 2006, a white paper with the subject line of “Personnel Crisis, 
Redstone Arsenal” was forwarded from the Program Executive Officer for PEO, 
Missiles and Space to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology).  This document warned of a looming personnel crisis 
brought on by the coincidence of four major issues.  The four issues were identified 
as Program Budget Decision 753, deterioration of the matrix support base, the aging 
workforce, and the influx of new organizations as a result or the 2005 BRAC 
decisions.  Recognizing that some or all of these factors were common to most 
organizations in the Department of Defense, further investigation into these strategic 
issues seemed warranted.  With the cooperation of PEO, Missiles and Space, an 
independent effort was initiated to further characterize the identified crisis with the 
intent of drawing conclusions and making recommendations that would benefit the 
PEO and other organizations confronted with similar strategic issues.   
The methodology employed was to use the Organizational Systems 
Framework model, a flexible tool capable of taking into account multiple interrelated 
variables, to characterize the complex issues being analyzed.  The primary methods 
for collecting the data necessary to effectively utilize the model were: literature 
research to obtain background information, teleconferences with select PEO, 
Missiles and Space staff members, and a site visit to conduct semi-structured 
interviews.  During our initial broad investigation of the strategic issues confronting 
the PEO, it became clear that in its characterizing of the Perfect Storm argument, 
PEO, Missiles and Space had discovered a related and more significant strategic 
issue.  This issue centered on the missile technology base and the risks knowingly 
or unknowingly being accepted in that area.  This component and its link to the 
original Perfect Storm initiatives became the focus of our research.  
Through the use of the open systems model, we characterized various 
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 areas:  inputs, throughputs (organizational design factors), and results.  In terms of 
organizational inputs, we found that the external environment to the PEO was 
identified as an area in which recent and evolving changes have placed an 
interrelated and substantial burden on the organization. The current operational 
environment in the execution of the Global War on Terror is resource intensive.  
Providing essential resources is a paramount priority—often driving an array of 
funding decisions.  In short, missile technologies have not faired well. Science and 
technology funding has been flat or declining, developmental systems have been 
eliminated or delayed, and production quantities have been reduced.  These factors 
and trends contribute to a number of consequences, including personnel and 
structural disruptions.  Recognizing that the Army has chosen to accept risk in 
certain areas, industry has moved its missile technical expertise into other fields with 
higher priorities in the current operational environment and with better prospects for 
future profits.    Although we found that PEO, Missiles and Space is capable of 
meeting its short-term output requirements, mid-to-longer-term results will be 
markedly more difficult to achieve (i.e., five years out).  If current trends continue, the 
intersection of the declining missile technology base issue, with the personnel issues 
identified in the Perfect Storm argument will lead to mid- and longer-term unresolved 
personnel problems.   
Based on these findings and other relevant analysis contained in this report, 
four conclusions were drawn regarding the strategic issues confronting PEO, 
Missiles and Space.  The primary conclusion is that PEO, Missiles and Space has 
entered into a vicious downward spiral from which substantial external assistance 
will be required to recover.  This spiral was initiated by recent funding decisions that 
industry has interpreted as a signal of limited prospects in missile-related 
technologies.  As more time passes and this signal is not changed, personnel 
discontinuities and mission loss further perpetuate related factors caught-up in the 
accelerating spiral: i.e., loss of institutional knowledge due to personnel departures 
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likely grow at a rate commensurate with that of the descent. The result of this vicious 
spiral will be lost developmental capability and degraded support to fielded systems.  
Several recommendations have been suggested that address the strategic 
issues facing PEO, Missiles and Space.  To recover or to intervene from the vicious 
spiral the PEO has entered will probably require external assistance necessary to 
reverse the trends and cues signaling industry.  The recommendation in this area is 
to develop a detailed cost benefit analysis that takes into account and describes the 
risk that knowingly or unknowingly has been accepted.  Additionally, scenario 
analysis may be a useful tool to capture and quantify the costs associated with a 
shrinking technological gap between the US and adversaries.  By characterizing the 
issue in this cost benefit format, more informed decisions as to priorities of funding 
can be made. 
In summary, this research was initiated based on strategic issues identified by 
PEO, Missiles and Space in April 2006.  These issues were believed to have some 
common characteristics with other organizations within the DoD—making their 
investigation a worthwhile endeavor.  The use of a flexible analytical tool enabled 
these strategic issues to be characterized and led to four conclusions and several 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
BG Samuel Cannon, PEO, Missiles and Space, authored a White Paper 
(Bogosian & Cannon, 2006, April 30) informing the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) of a “looming crisis regarding 
personnel necessary to support Army and Joint programs managed at Redstone 
Arsenal.”  The crisis is being precipitated by the coincidence of the following four 
initiatives or strategic issues:  (1) Program Budget Decision 753, (2) deterioration of 
the matrix support base, (3) the aging workforce, and (4) influx of new organizations 
as a result of the most recent BRAC decisions.  This paper researches and analyzes 
those strategic issues and develops conclusions and recommendations that may 
assist the organization in terms of strategic thinking and decision-making.  
Therefore, the purpose of this research was threefold: 
1. Describe and analyze the complex interaction and planning centered 
on the four strategic issues facing the Army Program Executive Office 
(PEO), Missiles and Space Command, Redstone AL.  A strategic issue 
is a “fundamental policy question or challenge affecting an 
organization’s mandates, mission, and values; product or service level 
and mix; clients, users, or payers; or costs, financing, structure, or 
management” (Bryson, 1995, p. 20). 
2. Describe and analyze aspects of these issues to assist PEO, Missiles 
and Space leaders and managers in terms of identifying and resolving 
these important issues, i.e., focused data collection, stakeholder 
analysis, generation of alternatives, and recommendations. 
3. Provide scientific observations and data points to the DoD, the United 
States Army and the Army Acquisition community regarding the 
strategic issues confronting acquisition commands today and how they 
are attempting to resolve the issues and maintain their position as a 
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 B. SCOPE 
The focus of this research was limited to the strategic issues facing PEO, 
Missiles and Space and the issues discovered during research which are relevant to 
PEO, Missiles and Space, the Army Acquisition community and the DoD.  The 
research analyzed the issues over a limited period of time beginning with the release 
of PBD 753 through the publication of this report.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for this professional report included literature reviews 
of the Army budget process, the aging of the workforce and Base Realignment and 
Closure.  The primary method of data collection was through the use of semi-
structured interviews with nearly a dozen members of PEO, Missiles and Space 
during a site visit and through multiple teleconferences and e-mail exchanges.  
These members included the senior leaders of the organization and mid-grade 
managers. (See Appendix A for interview questions).  Due to the complex nature of 
the data collected, the Organizational System’s Framework model was employed as 
the analytical tool to better understand these interactions at PEO, Missiles and 
Space, and to frame conclusions and recommendations.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the nature of the complex interaction and planning centered on the 
four strategic issues (Program Budget Decision 753, deterioration of the matrix 
support base, the aging workforce, and the influx of new organizations as a result of 
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2. Supporting Research Questions 
Who are the major stakeholders impacted by PBD 753 (and other major 
issues)? What do they have at stake, and how can Missiles and Space influence the 
issue positively? 
 What are the reasons behind a deterioration of the current matrix-support 
structure, and what are the alternatives to resolve the unintended consequences of 
that deterioration, including personnel processes?  
How can Missiles and Space command learn more about the influx of new 
organizations (and personnel) resulting from BRAC, and how can the command 
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 II. BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the organization of the PEO, Missiles and Space.  It 
outlines the mission, goals, capabilities, tasks and structure of the organization.  
Additionally, this chapter presents background information on the four strategic 
issues of initial concern identified in the Perfect Storm and how those issues are 
relevant to this research and to PEO, Missiles and Space.  Finally, a detailed 
description of the Organizational Systems Framework Model is provided in order to 
understand how the analytical tool was utilized to evaluate the strategic issues 
central to this research project.  
B. PEO, MISSILES AND SPACE 
Program Executive Office (PEO), Missiles and Space is the Army’s lead 
organization for the lifecycle management of missile systems.  Its mission is to 
provide an unprecedented level of service and support for PEO, Missiles and Space 
weapons systems (PEO, Missiles and Space, 2007a, p. ii). In this capacity, it is 
responsible for the development, acquisition, and sustainment of assigned 
warfighting systems.  The PEO is currently assigned and tasked to support 
programs that span four Battlefield Operating System (BOS) elements—including 
infantry, aviation, field artillery, and air defense artillery.  Additionally, the supported 
programs cover the full spectrum of the acquisition lifecycle, with some programs in 
the early stages of development while others are nearing retirement and disposal.  
PEO, Missiles and Space has six goals representing how it intends to 
successfully accomplish its mission, including meeting all the responsibilities it has 
been charged with. 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 5- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 • Excel beyond all others in fielding the best rocket, missile and space 
systems in the world 
• Effectively team with industry 
• Mature and weaponize critical technologies for the future force 
• Reduce the lifecycle cost of our systems and in-theater logistics 
footprint 
• Build the Army acquisition corps of the future 
Supporting the warfighters in current operations means ensuring they have 
safe, reliable, effective weapon systems.  This requires the PEO to accurately 
translate the end-users’ need expressed in a Capabilities Development Document 
(CDD) into a supportable weapon that provides the requested capability.  
Additionally, current operations may require timely changes or modifications to the 
program.  Production quantities may need to be increased or product improvements 
accelerated to provide the support required.  Meeting the warfighter’s immediate 
need is a critical task for the PEO and one that represents significant challenges.  
Advances in missile technologies continue to push weapon systems forward by 
providing increased capabilities with each increment.  These advances are not only 
taking place within the United States, but also abroad.  PEO, Missiles and Space 
must strive to stay ahead of potential rivals in system development.  In order to 
accomplish this, it must effectively accomplish the next two goals of teaming with 
industry and maturing and weaponizing the critical technologies required for the 
future force. 
A dynamic relationship exists between the government and industry.  When 
the relationship is working well, the efforts of both are synchronized and focused 
toward a common goal.  When it is not, resources are expended inefficiently, and 
neither side is satisfied with the result.  The better the relationship, the more likely 
the users’ needs will be met in timely manner.  In order to mature the technologies 
for the future force, industry must be involved.  Its involvement with identifying where 
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 good relationship with industry, the PEO gains the unity of effort necessary for 
effective development of systems.  Another way the PEO brings about efficiencies is 
by addressing lifecycle costs and logistical considerations. The PEO must consider 
all the costs of a system throughout its lifecycle—not just its developmental costs.  
Likewise, it must also consider the logistical tail required to support the system.  The 
failure to take these considerations into account could result in a system requiring 
more resources during the sustainment phase of the acquisition lifecycle than 
necessary.  The more resources spent on operating and maintaining existing 
systems, the less available for improvement or development of new systems.  The 
final goal necessary for the PEO to effectively accomplish its mission is to ensure 
the development of the acquisition corps members who will be responsible for 
acquiring the future force.  By putting in place a training and education plan for 
grooming future leaders, the acquisition corps will continue to improve and 
effectively accomplish its mission 
Accomplishing the goals required to meet its mission requires significant 
resources.  In order to provide the required “cradle to grave” support it has been 
tasked with, PEO, Missiles and Space employs approximately 1,400 personnel.  The 
personnel are organized into seven Project Offices that have been tailored to 
support a specific subset of the PEO’s programs that are generally focused on a 
particular BOS element.  Although the Project Offices vary in exact composition and 
organization, each contain personnel of similar disciplines that come from the three 
general personnel pools of Core, Matrix and Systems Engineering and Technical 
Assistance (SETA) contractor support.  The Project Offices organize the personnel 
from these personnel pools in the most efficient manner based on the lifecycle 
phases of its supported programs.  Project Offices with more developmental efforts 
taking place will have a larger number of engineering-focused personnel, while more 
logistics-oriented personnel are required for Project Offices supporting systems in 
the sustainment phase.  The organizational chart (Figure 1) of PEO, Missiles and 
Space is included below.  A listing of the PEO supported programs can found at 








Figure 1. Organization chart, PEO, Missiles and Space 
(PEO, Missiles and Space, 2007a) 
C. DEFENSE BUDGETING AND PROGRAM BUDGET 
DECISIONS 
The Department of Defense uses the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution System (PPBES) to prepare its budget.  Resource allocation, planning, 
policy implementation and managing a budget of this size and magnitude required 
the development or need for a formalized system.  At any given time, the Pentagon 
is planning, preparing and executing three different budgets.  The PPBES has four 
distinct and different phases that overlap, making it essential for an agency to keep 
up with what is going on in the previous or next phase.  The first phase is planning.  
It is in this phase that the initial steps are taken to develop the plan for the budget; 
this begins in the Executive branch with plans to layout a national defense strategy.    
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 Guidance (DPG).  The DPG is the official guidance from the Secretary to the 
services on how they should prepare their Program Objective Memorandums (POM) 
(Jones & McCaffery, 2004, pp. 97-99).   
The second phase is programming.   The goal is for each military component 
to design a POM that will answer how it plans to spend monies over a six-year 
period.    The POM must address fiscal restraints; it must support the Combatant 
Commander’s unrestrained Integrated Priority Lists (IPL), and it must support the 
guidance given by the Secretary of Defense in the DPG.  Additionally, the POM must 
meet the fiscal restraints as laid out in the DPG (which are total obligations by 
military department by year) because POMs are developed in even-numbered years 
and reviewed in the odd-numbered years.  The POMs are reviewed by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to ensure compliance with national strategy and the DPG, and 
to ensure that they also meet capability requirements and addresses force levels.  
Following the review by the JCS, the Chairman issues the Chairman’s Program 
Assessment (CPA) to assist the Secretary of Defense in the development of the 
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM).  The CJCS also provides recommendations 
and alternative solutions and budget proposals for the Secretary of Defense to 
consider prior to his issuing the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM).  The PDM 
adjusts or approves programs in the POMs.  The approved or amended POM is the 
baseline document in which departments will submit their budget inputs (2004, pp. 
100-101). 
For acquisition matters, CJCS is assisted in his advisory process by the Joint 
Resources Oversight Committee (JROC).  The JROC is chaired by the Vice-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and is staffed by the Vice-Chairs of all services.  The 
JROC reviews all joint acquisition programs or those in which a common interest has 
been established.  A program that has been deemed to meet joint requirements is 
labeled a priority by the JROC and is added into the POM and, further, the budget 
for funding.  Successful vetting and staffing of joint programs at this level may take 
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 The third phase is budgeting.  This begins with approved programs in each 
POM.  The items that support the POM are “cost out” by each military component for 
that budget year, and each component submits each part of the budget as a Budget 
Estimate Submission (BES).  In the even numbered POM years, the BES is a two-
year submission.  It is factored on the first two years of the POM as adjusted by the 
PDM.  The services amend the BESs during the odd-numbered years POM update, 
and they cover just one year.  The military secretaries under the authority of military 
department secretaries review each and every BES.  The DoD Comptroller, various 
OSD officials, the JCS, Deputy Secretary of Defense and, finally, the Secretary of 
Defense review the budgets of the military department secretaries.   This review is 
conducted along with the President’s Office of Management and Budget.  This is to 
ensure compliance with DPG, PDM and the National Security Strategy.  The 
Secretary of Defense makes all necessary changes and provides the rationale for 
each change in the form of the Program Budget Decision (PBD).  The PBD is to 
allow the secretary of each military department the time to submit appeals back to 
the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Secretary of Defense Comptroller.  
Program Budget Decisions are coordinated with all of the stakeholders on a 
particular issue.  Through this review process, all perspectives—including those of 
the Chairman of the Joint Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Service Secretaries, 
and the OMB—are considered as an integral part of the decision-making process.   
The Deputy Secretary of Defense considers the PBD and also the responses 
prepared by all interested parties.  Once decisions have been made on any issues 
identified by the Comptroller or OMB, the Defense Components are given an 
opportunity to resolve the issues with OUSD(C) as an out-of-court settlement or, 
subsequently, to appeal directly to the Secretary of Defense for final resolution (DoD 
Comptroller, 2007a) After final resolutions, the final defense budget is forwarded to 
OMB for submission as part of the President’s Budget (Jones & McCaffery, 2004, 
pp. 101-102). 
The final phase is execution.  This phase begins by requesting permission to 
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 going to spend the appropriations, the month, the quarter or by-year for multi-year 
appropriations.  The appropriations must now be attributed to individual programs 
and further allocated into the months in which they will be spent.  Once the Treasury 
and OMB receive the allotment approvals, the DoD begins the process of distributing 
the share of the budget to the different departments, agencies, and DoD commands. 
Then, the organizations begin to obligate and spend the allocations through the 
outlays of monies. This process is monitored by comptrollers at all levels of the DoD.  
By the end of September (fiscal year’s end), all accounts must be reconciled and all 
appropriations and spending accounted for prior to closing the accounts (2004, p. 
102). 
The Budget process and the generation of the PBD is important for this 
research due to the fact that PBD 753, published 23 December 2004 and 
announced in January 2005, initiated an Army activity to gain program reductions in 
order to fund other priority Army initiatives.  PEO, Missiles and Space’s part of those 
reductions were approximately $360 million to be realized over the FY 2006-2011 
period.  This amounts to an average reduction of about $60 million per year. 
Additionally, these reductions were targeted at the elimination of contractor support 
jobs.  
D. THE AGING WORKFORCE 
As mentioned above, the aging of the workforce has been a growing 
concern—not only within the DoD but also within the commercial industry.  In the 
United States today, there are approximately 22.8 million people aged 55 or over 
who are working.  They compromise approximately 16 percent of the workforce.  
The number of workers aged 55 or over is growing approximately 4 times faster than 
the workforce as a whole.  Because of the relative size of their group, as the Baby 
Boomers age, they will have a disproportionate impact on the overall age distribution 
of the nation’s population in general and the workforce in particular.  Baby Boomers, 
who in 2007 will range in age from 43 to 61, currently represent nearly 50% of the 
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 succeeding two generations (Generation X and the Millennial Generation) (Ernst and 
Young, 2006, January, p. 8).  
The importance of understanding the issue of an aging workforce is because 
PEO, Missiles and Space like any other organization, government or commercial, 
must develop effective strategies to confront these concerns.  The PEO has 
estimated that as much a half of its workforce is eligible to retire by FY 2008 and 
over three quarters by FY 2010.  The PEO cannot make a prediction as to exactly 
how many will retire, but it feels that based on current trends as many as 50% of 
those eligible will retire.  For the purposes of this project, it is important to 
understand that the issue does exist and that the organization has recognized it as a 
strategic issue (Bogosian & Cannon, 2006, April 30). 
E. BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC) 
BRAC, officially known as the Defense Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission, is the process used by the DoD and Congress to close excess military 
installations in order to save money on operations and maintenance and to achieve 
maximum efficiency in line with Congressional and DoD objectives.  The process 
begins when the Secretary of Defense submits a list of military installations to be 
closed, shrunk, enlarged or realigned.  More than 350 installations have been closed 
in four BRAC rounds: 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995.  The most recent round of BRAC 
completed in the fall of 2005 and, with the commission's recommendations, became 
law in November of 2005.  The BRAC process was developed in an attempt to 
achieve the government's goal of closing and realigning military installations despite 
the political challenges which often arise when facilities face reduction or elimination.  
The process has varied through the iterations slightly, but the objective has been 
fairly constant.  Because a military base can bring millions of dollars in federal 
money to its surrounding area each year, challenges raised by members of 
Congress from affected districts make such initiatives very difficult.  Congress 
created the BRAC process in 1988 as a politically acceptable methodology to pursue 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 12- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 independent commission (the BRAC Commission) evaluates the list by taking 
testimony from interested parties and paying visits to affected bases.  The BRAC 
Commission has the opportunity to make changes to the list.  The commission then 
submits its list to the President, who approves or disapproves the list in its entirety.  
The list then goes to Congress for action.  Congress has 45 days to disapprove the 
entire list, otherwise BRAC recommendations are final (Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission, 2007). 
The latest round of BRAC decisions approved by the President on 15 
September 2005 is going to having a significant impact on PEO, Missiles and Space.  
According to the PEO, as many as 4,700 Government jobs and 5,000 contractor 
jobs will be moving to the Redstone Arsenal area (Bogosian & Cannon, 2006, April 
30).  Redstone Arsenal will see significant gains, as this installation will be the new 
home to the Army Materiel Command (AMC) headquarters, the Space and Missile 
Defense Command (SMDC) headquarters as well as significant assets from the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA).  At the time of the BRAC deliberations, the 
arguments to relocate these organizations to Redstone Arsenal were: 1) Cost 
savings, 2) the collocation of units with similar missions, 3) enhanced jointness 
between MDA, SMDC, the Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), and NASA's 
Marshall Space Flight Center, and 4) an established Missile Defense Center of 
Excellence.  Additionally, the political decisions to relocate organizations were made 
under the assumption that the positions of those individuals who chose not to 
relocate with their organization would be filled by the local community.  To PEO, 
Missiles and Space, this is more competition for the already highly sought after 
skilled professions such as: 1) Rocket and Missile Engineers, 2) Propulsion 
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 F. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM’S FRAMEWORK MODEL 
 
Figure 2. The Organizational System’s Framework 
(Roberts, 2003) 
The Organizational System’s Framework model describes an organization as 
a system, and it assists in prescribing changes in the design factors.  A model is 
nothing more than an analytical tool to help us describe highly complex 
organizations.  The system’s perspective is based on several overarching 
assumptions and that an organization is open to its external environment. The 
boundary that separates an organization from its environment is permeable, 
meaning there is dynamic interaction between internal organizational variables and 
external factors—i.e., congressional oversight decisions affecting hiring decisions.  
The ideal is to keep the organization in dynamic equilibrium with its environment by 
ensuring key variables “fit” or are in congruence.  As the environment changes, 
organizations adapt to survive.  Of course, organizational changes can likewise 
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 mutual adaptation between the organization and its environment isn't guaranteed.  
Using a model must be done carefully and with the full understanding of its capability 
to effect positive change.  A model can not be expected to capture all of the complex 
relationships influencing an organization. Therefore, managers should anticipate that 
their changes may have unintended consequences—making the adoption of a less 
conservative change style more desirable.   
Organizational survival and viability can be described as a dynamic process 
of converting external, input and design factors into various organizational results 
(outputs and outcomes).  Because defense organizations face a plurality of 
stakeholders (external and internal) with different goals and objectives, stakeholder 
perceptions and evaluations are a substantial part of the “bottom line.”  With positive 
stakeholder views, an organization might choose to maintain the status quo.  
Likewise, as stakeholders perceive poor performance, either the organization adapts 
and changes direction or becomes irrelevant (bankrupt in the private sector). The 
point is when and what types of corrective interventions apply. Intervention can 
involve incremental changes (continual process improvement), transitional changes, 
and transformation (system-wide change).    Interventions create ripple effects 
where cause-and-effect may not be close together in time and space.    Misaligned 
parts reduce system efficiency and effectiveness (Roberts, 2003).  
The following paragraphs further describe each critical element and sub-
element within the model. 
1. Environment/Context 
According to research conducted by Grandrath at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, environment refers to external environmental forces and trends.  The 
external environment influences the organization through the actions of people, 
social influences and politics, technological and economic forces, and legal 
considerations. The environment often makes demands on the organization and 
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 environment offers realistic opportunities for the organization to be successful 
(Grandrath, 2000, p. 23). 
In addition to the external environment, context can be described as the 
organization’s view of its current situation in relation to its historical, political and 
social perspectives.  The historical perspectives of an organization might provide 
insight on how it is likely to respond to environmental turbulence.  Past leadership 
values and actions, cultural response to threatening events and trends, and the role 
of organizational values all contribute to how an organization will perform. 
2. Key Success Factors 
Key success factors are the critical indicators against which an organization 
must demonstrate at least adequate performance if it is to prosper and grow.  The 
specific factors will differ for each organization and are often larger in number and 
inherently more unclear for public organizations than for bottom-line-oriented private 
organizations (2000, p. 25). 
3. System Direction 
System direction is a leadership process that informs all relevant stakeholders 
as to the future direction or strategy of the firm.  Direction setting is perhaps the first 
charge of leadership, in terms of was a direction set, and does the direction fit with 
external forces and trends?  System direction is determined by the following critical 
attributes (2000, p. 25): 
a. Mandate 
Mandates are both formal and informal requirements on what to do (and not 
do) from external authorities (2000, p. 26).  Mandates are things the organization 
must and should do. 
b. Values 
The values of an organization are part of a belief system meant to shape and 
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 making and to settle disputes.  Values are typically part of an organizational 
philosophy of operations and help explain how personnel approach their work, 
manage internal issues, and relate to their external environment.  Values can differ 
between organization elements and individual values (2000, p. 26). 
c. Mission 
Mission is the stated purpose or reason an organization exists.  
d. Strategic Issues 
Strategic issues are core policy questions that affect an organization’s 
mandates, values, or mission (2000, p. 26). 
e. Vision 
A vision can provide clarity of an organization’s direction and purpose.  A 
vision can specify success in terms of mission, core values, basic strategies, goals 
and performance factors, ethical conduct and important rules for decision-making.  A 
vision can highlight a path to success (2000, p. 26). 
f. Goals 
Goals are known to motivate human behavior.  Similarly, specific, 
measurable, attainable, realistic and timed goals can motivate and concentrate the 
efforts of many employees.  The identification and obtaining of organizational goals 
is a useful criterion for determining leadership effectiveness and organizational 
performance.   
g. Strategies 
Strategy specifies the direction of the organization in terms of mission, values, 
goals, and objectives. The pattern developed by organizational policies, programs, 
actions, decisions, and resource allocation can define a strategy.  Strategy is usually 
the first organizational component to be addressed because it establishes the 
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 4. Design Factors 
Organization design factors refer to the individual elements and structure of 
the organization.  Grandrath asserts design factors typically reside in the 
management domain—i.e., managers intervene in terms of structure, processes, 
people, tasks and technology. Again, the central hypothesis of systems thinking and 
acting is the fit or congruence of the variables determines performance.  For 
example, if a university institutes distance learning using video-teleconference 
technology, but professors refuse to use it, then the misfit indicates the likelihood of 
poor performance.    
a. Task Jobs 
This comprises the work of an organization or the tasks that are to be done by 
the individuals, groups or by the organization as a whole.  The jobs that the 
organization does are constructed and formed around these tasks. 
b. Technology 
Technology is the physical and mental processes used to convert inputs into 
manageable outputs—i.e., how the core work gets done.  Technology in this context 
is much more than the devices and equipment used by the individuals within the 
organization, but includes also their knowledge and activities within and about the 
organization.  Technology can affect the actions of individuals within the organization 
and how it operates.  Increasing technology levels often leads to more efficient and 
effective organizational processes—which leads to a better flow of inputs into 
outputs (2000, p. 30). 
c. Structure 
Structure within an organization refers to the way the organization arranges 
individuals and groups concerning the jobs or duties they will perform—including 
how the work will be coordinated.  Groups and teams, functional and client-based 
divisions, and matrix relationships are examples of organizational structure.    
Structure also includes decision-making and communications structure, both of 
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 d. People 
There have been numerous studies concerning leaders, managers and 
followers, particularly in terms of achieving productive relationships.  Whom the firm 
hires, promotes, removes and retains obviously impacts organizational performance.  
The ability to understand and influence human strengths and weakness, 
organizational members’ motivations and needs is paramount according to most 
scholars and practitioners (2000, p. 32). 
c. Processes/Subsystems 
The processes and subsystems are the elements that weave the organization 
design factors together.  
Financial Management, Measurement and Controls 
Financial management, budgeting, accounting, and other control mechanisms 
are fundamental processes of organizational management.  
Human Resource Management 
Human resource management includes all policies dealing with recruitment, 
selection, retention, promotion, training and education required to develop the 
workforce that can achieve the goals formulated by management.  It forces the 
organization to look internally to determine if the people are the right mix.  This also 
includes the rewards program that provides motivation and incentives for the 
achievement of goals.  The purpose of a reward system is to align both the 
employees’ goals and the goals and direction of the organization.   
Communication, Information, Planning, and Decision-making 
This is the process for determining how the organization communicates both 
internally and externally.  Internally, it determines how the organization 
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 decision also includes the gathering and processing, distribution and evaluation of 
information, planning and decision-making.  
Acquisition and Contracting  
The acquisition and contracting process is how the organization acquires 
goods and or services from outside sources. 
5. Culture 
Organizational culture describes how people within the organization interact 
with each other and their stakeholders—i.e., the way of life for a group of people.  
Grandrath also explains that culture can be a direct growth of an organization’s 
values and beliefs, or a far cry from espoused values.  Values form the basic core 
positions of right and wrong at human, organizational and societal levels.  Culture 
often runs-deep and is slow to change.  Culture is an emergent variable developed 
over time and can be both an organizational strength and/or weakness.   
6. Outputs 
Outputs are what the organization produces, normally in terms of goods and 
services. Outputs may be visible indicators of organizational success (e.g., 
exploding Starbucks growth).  Outputs can be described in terms of three factors.  
How successfully does the organization meet strategic objectives?  How 
successfully does the organization use its scarce resources?  Last, how successful 
is the organization at positioning itself to seize opportunities and ward off threats 
presented by the environment (2000, p. 32). 
7. Outcomes 
Outcomes are the consequences of the outputs, including intended and 
unintended consequences.  They are typically more important, yet harder to 
measure than outputs.   For example, an output of additional submarines and 
strategic bombers might not have the intended consequence of defeating 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 20- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the critical issues that contributed to the development 
of the Perfect Storm described in Bogosian and Cannon’s White Paper and were the 
focus of this research.  For several years, generally accepted wisdom is that many 
organizations in the United States Army have been asked to do more with less and 
to make reductions where reductions were once unimaginable.  Now it appears that 
the Perfect Storm has arrived at the doorstep of PEO, Missiles and Space, requiring 
strategic thinking and acting to resolve identified issues.  This chapter outlined the 
fundamental analytical systems model as a way to describe all the major factors 
associated with organizational performance, particularly the strategic issues 
confronting PEO, Missiles and Space.  The understanding of this analytical tool will 
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 III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM INPUTS 
A.  OVERVIEW  
An accepted logical method of presenting analysis findings is by organizing 
key variables using the theoretical foundation contained within systems thinking, 
e.g., the Organizational Systems Model. This chapter presents findings obtained 
during the research process according to the input section of the systems model.  
Subsequent chapters will address the findings related to the throughput and results 
sections of the model.  The external environment/context, key success factors and 
system direction are addressed to describe PEO, Missiles and Space functions, and 
to provide an understanding of how changes to these elements of the model may 
positively or negatively impact the overall system.  Following the presentation of 
findings as they relate to a particular element of the model, analysis of these findings 
will be conducted.  The analysis summarizes the elements as they relate to the 
primary research question and provide a basis from which conclusions and 
recommendations can be drawn. 
B. FINDINGS: ENVIRONMENT/CONTEXT 
1. Political 
The first findings to be addressed are those relating to the 
environmental/context elements of the Organizational Systems Model.  As described 
in Chapter Two, these are factors that lie primarily outside PEO’s boundaries, but 
which can impact its operation— e.g., political, economic, social, and technological 
elements.  In the conduct of the research, four major findings were discovered that 
related to political factors.  The first was the challenge facing PEO, Missiles and 
Space in gaining political support for their Perfect Storm argument due to political 
capital spent during the most recent BRAC cycle.  Where the Perfect Storm 
argument warns of a “looming crisis regarding personnel necessary to support Army 
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 April 30), the arguments made during the BRAC decision analysis were quite the 
opposite.  In the political process that led up to the 2005 BRAC decisions, elected 
officials were successfully convinced the area had sufficient human resources to 
support not only all existing organizations, but also additional personnel 
requirements resulting from the influx of new organizations. On the surface these 
two arguments, Perfect Storm and BRAC, would seem to be in direct conflict with 
each other—making it very difficult for PEO, Missiles and Space to find support in 
political channels.  Getting the same political figures that successfully used the 
available human resources in the local area as strength in the BRAC argument to 
now support an argument that highlights a personnel challenge is not likely.  As the 
researchers discussed the political aspects of the Perfect Storm with the senior 
leadership of the PEO as it relates to BRAC, the respondents identified some key 
points necessary to put the arguments in perspective.  The first is that on the whole, 
BRAC is expected to be fully supportable by the human resources available in the 
Redstone Arsenal area. Of the approximately 4,700 Government and 5,000 support 
contractor jobs transitioning to the area from 2007-2011, most will be easily filled by 
qualified personnel. There are, however, some highly technical positions in which 
this may not be the case. These specific positions will be highlighted later when 
discussing the design factors of the systems organizational model.  The political 
challenge now facing PEO, Missiles and Space is in how to successfully craft a 
personnel argument which focuses on these limited positions that does not give the 
appearance of poor analysis in the BRAC decision.  The PEO is currently framing 
this argument in a manner that will be more politically supportable. 
The second political factor in the external environment is the recent change in 
control of the Congress as a result of the November 2006 elections.  The effects of 
this change are difficult to predict; but at a minimum, funding priorities will be 
reviewed and past decisions positively or negatively affecting PEO, Missiles and 
Space could be revisited. With the control of the Arms Services and Appropriations 
Committees changing hands, new relationships will need to be cultivated.  How 
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 relationships could make additional courses of action available or could close some 
approaches previously open to the organization.  The changes to the President’s 
budget submitted in February 2007 will indicate how effectively these relationships 
are being managed.  If the systems assigned to PEO, Missiles and Space receive 
higher-than-requested funding levels, this could indicate a more supportive 
environment; if they receive less, it could indicate less responsiveness to its Perfect 
Storm issues. 
The third factor in the political element of the environment is the Global War 
on Terror.  In this area, there are two competing findings that relate to PEO, Missiles 
and Space.  The first is that the systems managed by the PEO have by all accounts 
performed well during the execution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Although 
the majority of the systems have only seen limited use due to the type of warfare 
being employed in the current operational environment, they have provided the 
required capability when necessary.  The successful track record favors the PEO, 
but the current operational environment does not.  Politically, there is strong 
pressure to provide the warfighter with what he needs right now, but less pressure 
on developing what he might need tomorrow.  With this dynamic in play, the systems 
managed by PEO, Missiles and Space may be seen politically as “good enough” in 
the current environment.  The more difficult argument the PEO is left with, at least 
politically, is that the required capabilities for future conflicts are not being resourced.  
The capabilities necessary to defeat more technologically advanced adversaries 
such as North Korea, China or members of the former Soviet Union are not the 
focus of current political discussions.  Although the nations that represent these 
potential threats may see this as an opportunity to close the technological gap 
between themselves and the US, it is still a difficult argument for the PEO to make.   
In a highly competitive political environment, the best way to interpret the 
prioritization of an effort is by evaluating its level of resourcing—which brings this 
discussion to the final political component of the researchers’ findings: funding 
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 largest external factor impacting the PEO, Missiles and Space.  Of the four major 
initiatives identified as contributors to the Perfect Storm, PBD 753 is the most 
directly tied to these decisions and likely the most difficult to mitigate internally.  As 
stated in the previous paragraph, significant political pressure exists to ensure the 
warfighter receives the resources necessary to execute current operations. 
Decisions such as PBD 753 reflect this prioritization, but at the expense of other 
priorities.  In the case of PEO, Missiles and Space, PBD 753 resulted in 
requirements to return approximately $360 million over the FY06-11 timeframe.  The 
plan for meeting these cost objectives was briefed to the Department of the Army 
Staff in April 2005 and involved the elimination of support contractor positions and 
reductions in funding for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) 
production line. 
The changing of priorities from year to year can also result in programmatic 
changes to systems and technologies being developed.  If additional funding is 
required to meet requirements in more immediate years, then risk may be accepted 
by taking funding from developmental systems and applying them toward the more 
immediate requirements. In recent years, PEO, Missiles and Space has seen its 
assigned developmental systems identified as areas in which risk could be 
accepted.  The President’s Budget submitted in February 2007 continued this trend 
as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS), Army Tactical Weapon 
System (ATACMS), and Joint Common Missile (JCM) programs were eliminated; 
$250 million was taken out of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) 
program, as well (Assistant Secretary of the Army, 2007).  BG Cannon indicated he 
did not believe the Army Staff understood exactly how much risk they were 
accepting by making these decisions.  This point will be further expanded upon 
when this study discusses findings regarding the technological aspects of the 
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Figure 3. Missile RDT&E  
(Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, 2007, February) 
2. Economic 
The economic component of the external environment is the national 
economy and the fiscal health of our nation. Although the political priorities 
mentioned in the previous section identify where the spending goes, the economic 
component plays a significant role in determining how much there is to spend.  While 
the national economy continues at reasonable growth levels, trends in how the funds 
are allocated also continue along a trend line.  As depicted in the graph below 
(Figure 4), defense spending has continued on a downward trend, while 
nondiscretionary spending has continued to account for more and more of the total 
percent of federal spending.  What this illustrates is that the nation has taken on 
responsibilities in the form of nondiscretionary spending that, unless changed, will 
require changes to economic policies, or more difficult prioritization decisions 
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Figure 4. Defense Spending vs. Mandatory Spending 
(Heritage Foundation, 2007) 
In the second chart (Figure 5), the comparison is made to funding levels of 
previous conflicts and wars measured as a percent of GDP.  Even with the slight 
increase in funding during the initial years of the GWOT, the funding levels are still 
below those provided during any past efforts and even the peacetime spending 
levels of most previous years.  What these national trends mean to PEO, Missiles 
and Space is that unless the economy grows at an exceptionally faster rate, overall 
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Figure 5. Defense Budget as Percent of GDP 
(Department of Defense Comptroller, 2007b) 
3. Social 
The primary social element of the external environment is the aging workforce.  As 
the “Baby Boomer” generation ages, many social changes are likely to take place.  Several of 
these changes may have direct and indirect impacts on PEO, Missiles and Space.  There are 
two changes relative to the research and analysis of this project.  The first is that workers will 
remain in the workforce for longer periods of time.  This will directly impact the PEO in 
terms of the demographics of their workforce.  Some of these factors will be discussed later 
in analysis of the design factors.  Indirectly, an aging population will affect the economic and 
political elements of the external environment of the PEO.  The second change relative to the 
aging workforce is related to the expertise held by these employees: what changes are 
necessary to retain them.  As Nancy Lockwood writes in her article, “To retain older workers 
with their experience and knowledge base—and offset the skilled labor shortage—legislative 
changes must be made to allow older workers to continue to work, or return to work, without 
financial penalty (e.g., changes in social security, pension plans, IRS regulations)” 
(Lockwood, 2003).  This challenge for PEO, Missiles and Space is compounded by its 
limited ability to offer incentives to its employees in these skilled labor positions comparable 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 29- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 The final social element related to the environment surrounding PEO, Missiles 
and Space is the benefits associated with being a government employee and how 
effective these benefits are in attracting potential employees.  Because a significant 
portion of the arguments made in the Perfect Storm relate to the aging workforce, it 
is important to evaluate how easily these positions can be filled as retirements occur.  
One consideration that must be taken into account is the pension plans offered to 
government employees.  In today’s social environment, more people are working 
longer because of the increased life expectancy and the need to meet the 
associated costs with living longer.  Very few commercial organizations offer 
retirement plans as enticing as those offered to government employees. As 
healthcare costs for the elderly continue to climb, a job opportunity that offers 
pensions and medical benefits will be more highly sought after. 
4. Technological 
The last environmental/context component of the inputs affecting PEO, 
Missiles and Space are the technological factors.  It is in this area of the model 
where the direction research became more focused and the analysis more 
concentrated.  As previously alluded to in the political environmental factors, there is 
a risk associated with funding more immediate priorities with resources originally 
intended for research or developmental activities.  The President’s FY 08 Budget 
accepted risk in the areas represented by the systems managed under PEO, 
Missiles and Space.  During interviews in the research and data collection process, it 
became evident to the researchers that the PEO’s efforts to characterize the Perfect 
Storm argument had revealed a closely linked and potentially more serious concern.  
As it evaluated its workforce and the expertise in the missile-specific engineering 
fields, the PEO discovered what it labeled, “militarily significant critical technology 
atrophy.” (See Figure 6.)  In essence, it identified that not only were the personnel 
concerns highlighted in the Perfect Storm an issue because of the shortage of 
required personnel, but more importantly, those personnel being lost represented an 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 30- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 In its characterization of the external technological environment, PEO, 
Missiles and Space identifies multiple elements which we have grouped into four 
major components.  The first is the position of the United States missile capabilities 
in relation to our allies and potential adversaries.  During the time of interviews for 
this project, PEO, Missiles and Space was drafting a presentation to characterize the 
capability gap and trends in this area.  In its draft form, the presentation made the 
following five claims. 
1. Existing capability gaps are not being met. 
2. Performance gap closing between existing US and Foreign Systems 
3. Targets and threats are evolving and present greater challenges 
4. US science and technology no longer leads world in many missile-
relevant  categories. 
5. No new development of “Next Generation” tactical missiles. 
Confirming the degree of accuracy of these claims goes beyond the scope of 
this project; however, accepting the underlying premise that a technological gap is 
desirable is central to the characterization of the external technological environment.  
As with the development of all military weapon systems, the environment 
surrounding missile development is a competitive one. Unless resources are steadily 
allocated toward advancing critical technologies, the gap between the world leaders 
and the rest of the world will close in that particular field.  This brings us to the 
second major component of the technological environment: funding of the missile 
science and technology base. 
This is the first step in the development process—in which technologies are 
investigated and matured to the point where they can be weaponized.  Because the 
process often requires several paths to be followed until a useable capability is 
developed, this is a resource-intensive first step.  Both funding and the commitment 
of technological leaders by the government and industry are required for this phase 
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 than it is to close one.  In the past, the US has been willing to fund these activities to 
maintain at least one technological generation ahead of the nearest competitor.  
Based on recent and estimated future funding levels appropriated to PEO, Missiles 
and Space, maintaining this gap may no longer be a priority (Assistant Secretary of 
the Army, 2007). (See Figure 6)  This leads directly into the third element of properly 
creating incentives for industry. 
 
Figure 6. Missile Science & Technology 
(Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, 2007, February) 
=
=
Industry takes its cues from the developmental priorities set by the DoD through 
its allocation of resources and the perceived profitability in those areas. When 
developmental funding for a particular field decreases, this sends the signal that 
other areas may be more profitable in future years.  In response to this signal, 
industry will reallocate its technical expertise and commit its independent R&D 
efforts into more profitable developmental projects. Unlike other areas in which a 
technological gap is advantageous, missile technologies do not have a significant 
commercial application.  When the DoD makes a decision to accept risk in aviation, 
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 communications, or other technological areas, an incentive remains in place for 
industry to push the technological envelope in hopes of future commercial sales.  
Because this is not the case with vital missile technologies, industry has no incentive 
to keep critical personnel in those areas or to invest resources toward developing 
new technologies or sustaining systems already developed and fielded.  As a result, 
industry has already begun to reassign personnel out of missile critical technologies.  
A recent study conducted by PEO, Missiles and Space found a decrease in 32-63% 
of personnel in these fields by its largest industrial partner. Further research is 
underway to compare these results and verify the trend with other members of 
industry in the missile development field. Similar results are expected, highlighting 
what the PEO is calling an unrecoverable erosion of the technological base.  It is this 
technological base which represents the final element of the technological 
environment. 
.  
Figure 7. Military Significant Critical Technology Atrophy 
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 It is clear that the DoD has accepted risk by reducing funding for 
developmental efforts.  What is not clear is exactly the level of risk it has accepted or 
whether or not it has been accurately characterized.  If the strength and depth of the 
technological base (along with the capability gap between the US and its 
competitors) have been effectively characterized, then the accepted risk can be 
mitigated by increased resourcing—should a threat quickly emerge.  If, however, 
these estimates have overestimated the technology base and/or the current 
capabilities gap, then increased resourcing will not be able to mitigate emerging 
threats.  It is at this point in evaluating the technological risk that the personnel 
argument made in the Perfect Storm reemerges.  After a prolonged period of no new 
development in a technical field, the subject matter expertise is lost.  When this 
occurs, no matter how many new resources are applied, a relearning of the field 
must take place before advances can be made.  Many of the current engineers in 
the missile field are in the latter stages of their careers.  This component of the issue 
will be expanded upon in the design factors of the organizational systems model.  
With no significant future in missile technologies visible to industry, the next 
generation of missile developers is not seen as a worthwhile investment. 
C. ANALYSIS: ENVIRONMENT/CONTEXT 
Based on these findings, the external environment/context surrounding PEO, 
Missiles and Space could best be described as challenging.  The combination of 
political, economic, social, and technological factors comprising the external 
environment to the organization will require positive adjustments in other areas if the 
same desired results are expected to be achieved as outputs of the PEO.  Because 
the organizational model that defines the PEO continuously changes as throughput 
and results provide feedback, it is important to evaluate the environment in terms of 
trends.  Politically, the most significant trend is the waning support for the war in 
Iraq.  As this trend continues, the political trend of providing the warfighter with what 
he needs to successfully execute the GWOT will gradually become less of a priority.  
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 available for defense spending.  Although this general trend has been consistently 
downward for years, the trend may intensify as a result of political factors.  This will 
further aggravate the adverse environment already facing PEO, Missiles and Space.  
The significant trends in this area have been to prioritize funding of systems being 
utilized in the current operational environment at the expense of those geared 
toward other national threats, and to accept risk and delay or eliminate next-
generation systems for more immediate funding needs.  In both of these cases, 
PEO, Missiles and Space is not in a favorable position based on the weapon 
systems they manage.  The combination of these trends in turn signals to the 
industrial base that sectors other-than-missile-related technologies may be more 
profitable.  The mid-to-long-term effects of this trend can have a significant adverse 
effect on PEO, Missiles and Space.  The current organization could become 
dysfunctional, and a more optimal system capable of surviving in the current external 
environment may need to arise.   
D. FINDINGS: KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
The second input of the organizational systems model is the key success 
factors.  The primary research efforts in this area were to determine whether or not 
the PEO identified the correct factors, whether recent results of the system 
confirmed this, and finally whether or not the PEO saw the need to reevaluate its 
measures of success.  The four key success factors identified by the PEO are: 1) 
Perform as the Army’s centralized manager for assigned programs, 2) As the 
responsible management official, provide overall direction and guidance for the 
development, acquisition, testing, production, product improvement, fielding and 
sustainment of assigned programs, 3) Place primary management emphasis and 
oversight on total life-cycle cost, schedule and performance while ensuring 
compliance with applicable national policies such as environmental protection and 
socioeconomic programs, and 4) Maintain a total Army perspective in managing 
assigned programs, and keep the senior Army leadership fully apprised of program 
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 the program (Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, 2007a, p. iv).  Through 
interviews with members of the PEO, it became clear to the researchers that the 
Perfect Storm and its surrounding issues centered on one particular key success 
factor; although the first three success factors have relevance to the research, the 
fourth is where attention needed to be focused.  This success factor concerns the 
voicing of the Perfect Storm issues and the related development and packaging of 
the industrial base concerns.  In addition to these stated success factors or 
responsibilities, the PEO (like all other organizations) is concerned about its survival 
and the well-being of its employees.  These unwritten measures of success must 
also be considered when evaluating its strategic decision-making process.  
Based on the PEO’s recently generated results that relate to the first three key 
success factors, we can determine that the organization performed well; those 
factors were most likely correctly determined.  When evaluating the results that 
serve as a metric for performance as it relates to the fourth key success factor, a 
less conclusive answer is arrived at.  The challenge in this area is in interpreting the 
boundary of the system and how PEO, Missiles and Space relates to the larger 
Army system.  The fourth factor implies that keeping the Army leadership fully 
informed is beneficial to the PEO, Missiles and Space system, or that the survival of 
the PEO is secondary to the objectives of the Army.  In either interpretation, the 
systems model boundaries would determine whether or not this was a key success 
factor.  For the purposes of our analysis, the assumption that PEO, Missiles and 
Space would have survival and retention of personnel as a key success factor was 
made.  In determining whether or not the PEO Staff saw the need to reevaluate their 
measures of success, it is clear they are at least assessing their performance and 
appear willing to change if necessary.  Again, there are no significant findings in this 
area. 
E. ANALYSIS: KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
Given the findings concerning the environment/context and the trends in 
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 success of its system may hinge on how well it executes its fourth key success 
factor and how the Army leadership responds to its issues.  Overall, this component 
has a positive impact on the PEO, but does not have a significant impact on the 
organization’s systems operations—at least in terms of the issues central to the 
Perfect Storm and related issues. 
F. FINDINGS: SYSTEM DIRECTION 
The final component of the input section of the organizational systems model 
is the system direction.  For PEO, Missiles and Space, setting this system direction 
in the wake of PBD 753 has been a priority.  Its focus in this area has been to 
identify the impact of this shock to the organization and to determine a course of 
action to stabilize the system.  Findings in this area can be broken down into the 
seven subcomponents identified in the Organizational Systems Framework model. 
1. Mandate 
The first subcomponent is mandate. As in the case of most military 
organizations, findings in this area are fairly clear.  PEO, Missiles and Space has a 
formal mandate to manage its assigned systems to specified cost, schedule and 
performance measures.  Additionally, it is required to comply with higher-echelon 
directives such as PBD 753 and congressionally directed regulations and 
procedures.  The only significant finding in this area is that due to these mandates, 





The values of the organization and its impact on the overall operation of the 
system can be significant.  In the case of PEO, Missiles and Space and the issues 
surrounding the Perfect Storm, most of the relevant findings in this area center on 
the recent merger and the effects of PBD 753 on support contractors.  In January 
2005, PEO Tactical Missiles and PEO Air Space and Missile Defense merged to 
form PEO, Missiles and Space.  This merger took place only one month after the 
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 issuing of PBD 753—which targeted “support contractors” as the primary area in 
which directed efficiencies should be made.  As will be discussed in the analysis of 
the design factors, every effort was made to gain the efficiencies through natural 
attrition and retirements.  Whether beneficial or detrimental to the organization, this 
personnel-first approach sent a message to the organizational employees that they 
were important.  Although personnel may have been retained simply because they 
were essential to the operation of the system and future personnel cuts to meet the 
remaining efficiency may be necessary, this initial round tells us something about the 
values of the organization.  This point, however, has limited influence in terms of the 
direction of the system.  Had there been many personnel cuts and increased 
workloads for the remaining employees, this would have signaled a change in 
direction. 
3. Mission 
The mission is a powerful component of the direction of the system.  In the 
case of PEO, Missiles and Space, its mission was not changed with the mandate of 
PBD 753 and remains as outlined in Chapter Two.  The recent presidential budget 
decisions that have resulted in the termination or delay of systems development 
have only reduced the scope of their mission and perhaps made it a more difficult 
mission to accomplish.  The primary findings in this area are related to what changes 
to their mission may be necessary if current trends continue.  In its Declining Missile 
Base presentation, PEO, Missiles and Space identifies that as a result of recent 
budget decisions, no programs under its management are due to transition from the 
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Figure 8. The Eroding Business Base  
(Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, 2007, February) 
If for six years there is no planned execution of this component of its mission, 
the question arises of whether to retain the personnel, training, and resources 
focused on this element, or to simply eliminate this part of the mission.  If the six-
year period is only a pause in future missile development, then changing the mission 
would not be wise.  Although continued resources will be inefficiently spent to 
maintain a capability not being utilized, it will be more cost-effective than losing the 
skill set and being forced to redevelop it within the organization.  If, however, these 
periods indicate the beginning of the end to missiles as warfighting systems, then 
the mission should be changed and continue to change as the systems the PEO 
manages are slowly phased out of the inventory.  This decision will hinge on the 
resolution of the Perfect Storm and related issues outlined in the next component of 
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 4. Strategic Issues 
Bogosian & Cannon’s White Paper is the characterization of some of the 
strategic issues facing PEO, Missiles and Space that may effect the direction of the 
system.  The primary and secondary research questions identified in Chapter One 
identify how the direction may be intentionally or unintentionally changed based on 
the resolution of these issues.  Our findings have revealed additional strategic issues 
that are also significant to the PEO.  The most significant issue presented to us 
during research and interviews with the PEO staff was the classification of missile 
technology as an asset of national security and as a resource that must be 
protected.  This argument is closely related to the Perfect Storm personnel issues 
and was summarized earlier in this chapter under the technological environment 
section.  Essentially, the strategic issue being faced is that current trends indicate no 
future missile development for any of the four battlefield operating systems 
supported by the PEO.  BG Cannon indicated he did not know whether or not the 
Army staff recognized they eliminated all missile development, or if they evaluated 
each of the decisions independently and failed to realize the sum effect of their 
decisions.  The resolution of these strategic issues could have a range of impacts on 
the direction of the system.  The system could continue to proceed along its present 
direction or take a turn that leads to the collapse of PEO, Missiles and Space. 
5. Vision 
A vision can clarify an organization’s direction and purpose by illustrating a 
future state and identifying the path to get there.  Our findings in this area indicate 
that PEO, Missiles and Space is anticipating successful resolution of the strategic 
issues it is presently facing.  This position is based on the future state expressed in 
the PEO’s vision—which has missiles and missile-related technology playing a key 
role in the Army’s warfighting strategy.  The vision identifies a path that mitigates the 
impact of the four primary elements contributing to the Perfect Storm and related 
issues.  This path will be further defined in subsequent paragraphs that outline the 
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 6. Goals 
The goals PEO, Missiles and Space have established were listed in Chapter 
Two.  In Chapter One, we stated our research in this area would need to determine 
what, if any, goals were established by the organization that directly related to the 
Perfect Storm and associated issues.  The primary short-term goal of fending off the 
efficiencies mandated by PBD 753 was not successful.  The Perfect Storm argument 
stated: “Now is the absolute wrong time for attempting to gain personnel efficiencies 
at Redstone Arsenal” (Bogosian & Cannon, 2006, April 30). But, the PEO was 
unsuccessful in its argument.  The focus of the PEO then shifted to mitigation 
options.  During our research, we discovered the organization had put in place a 
Strategic Workforce Transformation Plan (which will be discussed in more detail in 
the next section of this chapter).  The plan identified seven goals focused on 
mitigating the effects of the four elements of the Perfect Storm.  The seven goals 
are: 1) Develop a Living five-year plan to recruit a diverse, highly motivated and 
talented workforce, 2) Establish training and development that links to the mission in 
order to achieve yearly performance goals, 3) Target programmatic areas that will be 
losing expertise in the short- (3-5 years) and long-term (5+ years), 4) Provide aging 
workforce the opportunity to share their expertise with new hires, 5) Partner with 
academic institutions, Government programs and private organizations to maintain 
an effective workforce, 6) Promote a lifelong learning environment, and 7) Develop a 
multi-functional culture (Parmer, 2006, September).   
Our findings on these goals are that they are well conceived and support the 
vision, mission, and key success factors previously covered in this chapter.  
However, we find they were most likely established too late to fully mitigate the 
impact of the Perfect Storm issues.  Due to the academic and on-the-job training 
required in the more technical positions, mitigation strategies that are just now being 
employed may not produce the required number of workers until some time after 
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 7. Strategies 
Changes to the external environment necessitated changes in other areas of 
the organization in order for the system to remain stable.  PEO, Missiles and Space 
employed two strategies for dealing with the changes with one being internally 
focused toward the design factors, and another aimed at addressing the outcomes 
generated by the PEO.  The first internally focused strategy is the Strategic 
Workforce Transformation Plan mentioned previously in the goals.  This plan 
focuses internally on the organization and the design factors which capture the 
operations and inner working of the PEO.  In simple terms, the strategy was to grow 
the next generation of personnel to replace those identified in the Perfect Storm 
argument who would be retiring, taking positions in BRAC organizations, eliminated 
due to PBD 753, or returned to their parent matrix organization.  The strategy 
identifies critical positions or fields within the PEO that must be intensely managed.  
These positions are primarily the more technical positions in which the greatest risk 
has been identified.   
Utilizing partnerships with academic organizations, internships, and expanded 
recruiting efforts to attract qualified personnel is the next phase of the strategic plan.  
During our site visit, we discovered a relationship with the University of Alabama in 
Huntsville (UAH) had been in place for more than fifteen years.  This program, 
Students Working at the Army in Parallel (SWAP), is evidence that at least some of 
the personnel issues PEO, Missiles and Space is facing today were experienced 
and addressed at some point in the past.  Further evidence of this is the unique and 
specialized Missile Systems Engineering degree that UAH offers.  The strategic plan 
hinges on attracting personnel and then providing them with incentives to remain 
with the organization.  When the staff was questioned as to whether or not they had 
sufficient incentives to compete with industry, a clear answer could not be given, but 
there were mechanisms identified that would enable the government to be 
competitive.  As we further questioned how the strategy may be providing education 
and training for individuals who would then leave to work for the higher salaries 
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 Storm argument with the eroding missile technology base issue.  As previously 
mentioned, industry will focus its efforts where it sees the most potential return on 
investment.  If in the future the missile development business again appears 
profitable, industry will need experts in the field to spearhead its efforts.  If its internal 
experts have been moved to other projects as the figures presented earlier in this 
chapter indicate, then it will look external to the organization to fill these positions.  
Given the potential financial gains, industry most likely can offer an incentive 
package that the government can not match.  This apparent shortcoming in the 
internally focused strategy of the PEO is exactly what the second prong of their 
strategy addresses. 
As we described in Chapter Two and identified at different points in this 
chapter, the model defining PEO, Missiles and Space’s organization is a living 
model; the results constantly fed back into the throughput and inputs in a continuous 
process.  The second prong of PEO Missile and Space’s strategy is to forecast 
results based on the changes to the inputs.  Specifically, the strategy focuses on 
highlighting the outcomes that other stakeholders may not have correctly identified 
when making recent budget decisions.  The industrial base and missile-critical 
technologies issues related to the Perfect Storm are the outcomes the PEO, in its 
strategy, hopes will signal more risk has been accepted than previously thought or 
understood.  This effort utilizes what, in terms of the systems model, are the 
feedback loops in an effort to change the external environment to one more 
favorable to PEO, Missiles and Space.   
E. ANALYSIS: SYSTEM DIRECTION 
Based on the findings in this area of the model, some of the impacts of the 
Perfect Storm elements can and are being mitigated by a shift in the direction of the 
organization.  The strategies put in place are having a positive effect—which will be 
discussed later in the findings of the design factors for which they were oriented.  
The effectiveness of the second prong of the strategy is at addressing the 
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 changes to the mission of the PEO will need to be made.  It is clear that the mission, 
vision, goals, and strategies are currently based on the DoD continuing to have 
missile weapon systems in its strategic vision.  If this is not the case, then significant 
adjustments will need to be made; the organization will have to endure a drastic 
reorganization to be more efficiently tailored to produce the desired outputs.   
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Research revealed the environment/context external to PEO, Missiles and 
Space is not a favorable one, and is in fact quite challenging.  Short-term funding 
issues may be leading to long-term technological problems.  The key success 
factors have, based on our findings, accurately taken into account this adverse 
environment and provided a focus for the organization. The system direction has, in 
turn, been oriented toward those key success factors; likewise, the mission, vision, 
and goals are aligned with the strategy for this shift.  Based on the changes to the 
inputs of the system, either the PEO must become more efficient or the expectation 
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 IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM 
THROUGHPUTS 
A. OVERVIEW  
This chapter presents the findings and analysis relevant to the throughput 
section of the organizational systems model, e.g., design factors.  The same format 
utilized in presenting the data for the input section in Chapter Three is followed.  
Findings relative to the five elements of the design factors is presented and an 
analysis of those findings is conducted.  The focus of these findings and analysis is 
to provide an understanding of how PEO, Missiles and Space operates, how the 
inputs previously discussed affect operations, and how changes to operations affect 
the results of the system. Design Factors of Structure, Tasks/Jobs, People, 
Technology, and Processes are addressed from the perspective of the Perfect 
Storm and related issues.  Focus is on the primary elements of these areas that are 
relative to the issues being discussed, and how they interact to produce the results 
of the system. 
B. DESIGN FACTORS 
As stated in Chapter Two, this section of the model represents the area under 
the most direct control of PEO, Missiles and Space.  The premise of the Perfect 
Storm was that directed changes to the external environment of the system (PBD 
753) without changes to the desired results could not be achieved simply by making 
internal adjustments to the design factors that define how the organization operates.  
Our research efforts in this area focused on determining whether or not this was an 
accurate representation of the situation and whether or not the position taken by the 
PEO was valid.  
1. Findings: Structure 
In order to understand how the five design factors interact, it is necessary to 
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 Missiles and Space is a complex organization with a wide range of responsibilities.  
The PEO is comprised of seven Project Offices which each manage their assigned 
systems.  Although the size and structure of each Project Office varies based on the 
systems its supports, each office has similar capabilities with common 
characteristics.  The personnel that work in the PEO come from four primary 
sources: core, matrix, military and contractor support.  The core forms the base of 
the organization and accounts for the majority of the leadership and approximately 
32 % of the total workforce.  This group is responsible for the programmatic 
functions related to the assigned weapon systems and the overall acquisition 
strategy.  The matrix personnel are the technical experts that provide inputs to the 
core members enabling them to make informed decisions.  PEO, Missiles and 
Space receives support from six different matrix organizations that each provides a 
specific technical skill.  All matrix organizations have a pool of personnel from which 
they assign technical support to acquisition organizations at Redstone Arsenal as 
their expertise is needed.  They are designed as a flexible workforce to be utilized 
for a specific task and then returned to their matrix pool for assignment to another 
project.  Matrix support personnel make up approximately 40% of the workforce 
within PEO, Missiles and Space.  The third source of personnel is the military.  The 
assigned military make up the smallest component of the workforce at only 4%.  
Their primary role is to provide leadership and guidance to the organization and to 
serve as the key liaisons between the developers and the user community.  They 
are assigned on a rotational basis and typically have tours of 2-3 years.  The final 
source of personnel is from commercial contractor support.  These are the Systems 
Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA) personnel who provide a specific 
technical expertise that is not available through the matrix pools.  When a specific 
skill is required to provide oversight of a technical aspect during system 
development, a SETA employee may be brought on to the government team 
because this skill set is highly unique and not in frequent enough demand to be part 
of the core or matrix organizations.  Where the core, matrix and military personnel 
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 constrained by budget.  Personnel in this category presently account for 24% of the 
workforce within PEO, Missiles and Space. 
When discussing the structure of the PEO and the Project Offices, it is 
important to include the members of industry with which the government works.  
Although technically not part of the organization, they are an integral component of 
the structure that must be worked with hand-in-hand to successfully develop, 
produce, and maintain warfighting systems.  Through the use of Integrated Product 
Teams (IPT), the government and its contracted material developers have become 
more of a joint structure.  When analyzing PEO, Missiles and Space through the 
organizational systems model these IPTs must be considered part of the structure in 
order to effectively capture how the system operates. 
Within the structure of the design factors there are three main areas on which 
we concentrated our findings.  The PBD 753, matrix support, and the industrial base 
each have significant relevance to the Perfect Storm and related issues.  The first of 
these areas to be addressed is PBD 753.  This decision affected the structure of the 
organization by targeting SETA employees within government organizations.  
Although not clearly stated in the decision, it is evident the PBD was based on the 
assumption that subordinate organizations were operating with excess personnel. 
By requiring the mandated efficiencies to be arrived at through the elimination of 
SETA and not simultaneously reducing the required outputs of the organizations, 
this inference can be made.  The question our research needed to answer, then, 
was whether or not the assumption was valid.  If the assumption was correct, then 
the outputs of the system could remain the same.  If, however, the assumption was 
incorrect, then changes to the outputs would be necessary to keep the system in 
balance. Our finding on this issue revealed the assumption at the time of this 
research was for the most part valid.  There are, however, three caveats to this 
finding.   
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 2. Of the positions eliminated to date, most would have been eliminated 
independently of the PBD.   
3. In addition to the personnel positions, minor cuts to the GMLRS 
program were also required to meet required efficiencies. 
At the time of our site visit, 154 positions had been eliminated in order to 
reach the targeted cost efficiencies required by PBD 753 (Human Resource 
Manager, 2007).  A plan has been implemented to meet the remaining required 
personnel cuts, but the plan does not reach the full 300 positions estimated in the 
Perfect Storm. During our interviews, it became evident that the final cuts would be 
difficult and could prove the assumption false.  Unlike the initial cuts, the positions to 
be identified for elimination most likely would not yet have been.  As previously 
mentioned, PEO, Missiles and Space was born out of the merger of two separate 
PEOs in January 2005.  Most of the cuts made to date would have been eliminated 
as part of the efficiencies associated with the creation of the new organization.  Now 
that these positions have been eliminated, the PEO will need to address other 
elements of the design factors to meet its required outputs.  The impact of PBD 753 
on the PEO has been negative because it did require the elimination of positions, but 
the net result to the system has been neutral based on its continued ability to meet 
required outputs.  At this point in time, the cuts appear to have only eliminated the 
unnecessary excess portion of the organization.  The effects of further cuts may 
prove to be negative not only to the design factors, but to the overall organizational 
system as well. 
The second area of matrix support was also one of the four major initiatives 
that comprised the Perfect Storm.  The argument made by PEO, Missiles and Space 
is that the matrix support base has been so poorly managed over the past decade 
that it is no longer capable of providing the quantity or quality of technical experts 
necessary to support its customers.  Our findings on this topic were mixed.  The 
matrix support base has not been managed as well as it could have been, but the 
cost of this mismanagement and the risk it represents are difficult to quantify.  
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 when necessary, or provide a skill set that the matrix had not developed in its pool, 
any problems with the matrix have been masked.   
During our site visit, we asked the technical personnel on the PEO staff 
whether they were pleased with the quality of the matrix personnel they were 
receiving from the pools.  We also posed this same question to technical members 
of the Project Offices. In both cases, they indicated that they were pleased with the 
personnel, but also did have some concerns.  The primary concerns were that the 
expertise had become somewhat stove-piped—one of the arguments alluded to in 
the Perfect Storm.  Although training and education may be able to effectively 
provide the matrix pools with qualified individuals, the issue facing the PEO is that 
much of the institutional knowledge and histories of the decisions surrounding 
weapon systems can not be easily transferred.  In an ideal situation, a new 
employee would have a lengthy transition period with the matrix personnel holding 
the institutional knowledge.  This, however, is not a cost-effective method for doing 
business—at least in the short-term.  Because of the inability to hire the government 
employees back as SETA support as was the practice prior to PBD 753, the 
transition period is not likely to occur—resulting in the loss of the institutional 
knowledge.  Based on these findings, the assessment of the matrix support system 
on the PEO is negative.  Although the majority of the adverse effects are yet to be 
realized, it is clear based on the current path that they will be. 
The final area to be addressed regarding the design factor of structure is the 
industrial base.  The industrial base itself lies outside of the organization in the 
external environment discussed in Chapter Three.  Why this is being addressed in 
the structure of the organization is because of the shared pool of technical experts 
from which both industry and PEO, Missiles and Space draw.  The boundary 
between the external environment and the organization relative to this issue is 
somewhat permeable and free flowing.  Because of this relationship, it is important 
to include these limited personnel resources as a component of the structure.  In the 
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 element relative to the Perfect Storm, but as initial findings were made it became 
evident that the personnel aspect of the industrial base was in fact an area that must 
be considered.  The majority of the significant findings in this area were addressed 
when discussing the technological elements of the external environment earlier in 
this chapter.  The specific findings that relate to the structure of the organization are 
those that address the shared pool of technological experts.  Over the past 15 to 20 
years, two significant factors have had a significant impact on the missile industrial 
base and the personnel that work in these highly technical fields.  The first is the 
Army has downsized from over 730,000 in 1990 to just over 512,000 in today’s force 
(Department of Defense Statistical Analysis Information Division).   A smaller force 
means less warfighting systems, which in turn results in less demand for missile 
systems and less required technical expertise from the shared pool to work in both 
government and industry roles.  The second factor is the consolidation of defense-
oriented business through mergers over that same time period that further reduced 
the demand on the shared personnel pool.  As a result of those two factors, the 
industrial base and the common pool of personnel to the structure of the 
organization have shrunk dramatically.  What is left is now in terms of the technical 
expertise in the missile development field is consolidated under a few major 
contractors and the government.  In industry, the leader is Lockheed Martin who now 
provides an estimated 80-85% of the missile-related acquisitions PEO, Missiles and 
Space engages in (Business Manager, 2007).  These findings illustrate a very 
dependent relationship between the government and limited producers of missile 
technologies.  The trends which indicate industry is moving its personnel from the 
common personnel pool out of the missile-related fields and into more profitable 
areas demonstrate how the structure for PEO, Missiles and Space can be 
weakened.  Essentially, it does not matter how many resources are provided as 
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 2. Analysis: Structure 
Our findings in this area indicate that PEO, Missiles and Space is structurally 
capable of producing the short-term outputs the organization is designed to 
generate.  The mid-to-longer-term effects of PBD 753, the matrix personnel pool, 
and the shrinking industrial base will likely impact the structure of the organization in 
a way that will substantially challenge the organizations’ ability to produce mid- and 
longer-term desired outputs (five years out).  
3. Findings: People 
People are the central strategic issue of Bogosian & Cannon’s White Paper.  
Each of the four initiatives has an identified adverse effect on the personnel working 
for PEO, Missiles and Space.  On the surface, it is relatively clear that all four 
initiatives will have the suggested negative effect on the organization.  Yet, the focus 
of research in this area was to go beyond how the initiatives would in general affect 
the workforce, and to determine what specific groups of people were going to be 
affected.  By doing this, the researchers could assess the impact on the design 
factors of the organizational systems model and determine the effect on the overall 
model.  The findings in this area were grouped into three areas consisting of 
technical, retirement, and BRAC. 
Because of the wide range of tasks performed by the organization, PEO, 
Missiles and Space is comprised of people with various skill sets.  Many of these 
positions require a very skilled and educated person, while others require less 
technical skills and formal education.  Although the Perfect Storm and related issues 
address all of the positions in the PEO, it is the highly technical positions where the 
greatest risk has been identified.  The combination of the four initiatives will impact 
all positions; however, mitigation strategies are much easier to develop for lesser 
skilled positions because of two factors.  The first is there is a larger pool of qualified 
personnel to perform those tasks.  The more training and specific education 
requirements required for a position, the lower the number of qualified potential 
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 department of PEO, Missiles and Space. They identified positions to us that were 
difficult to fill.  One example provided was an Operations Research Analyst.  In one 
particular case, a job opening was advertised and only attracted 3 applicants for a 
position paying between $74,000 and $97,000 annually (Human Resource Manager, 
2007).  All three of those that applied were offered jobs.  The second factor limiting 
mitigation strategies is the timeframe required to properly educate and train an 
employee for a position.  One of the senior technical analysts of PEO, Missiles and 
Space provided us with a timeline of seven to nine years for a person to complete 
basic eligibility requirements, and 11-12 years before they will have enough practical 
application and job experience to be useful in a technical role (Senior Leader, 2007). 
Estimating what the optimal size of the workforce will be a decade out is difficult, and 
the timeframe greatly limits mitigation options.  Based on these findings, the 
technical personnel issues within the organization are the ones that present the 
greatest risk to PEO, Missiles and Space.  If efforts to attract, train and retain are not 
effective the organizational system will not function efficiently. 
Like the rest of the workforce in the country, a large percentage of PEO, 
Missiles and Space’s employees at or approaching retirement age.  As of 24 
September 2006, 52% of the workforce was 50 years or older (Parmer, 2006, 
September).  Although this trend applies to all skill level positions, based on the 
findings in the previous section, the people we are most interested in are the 
retirement-age personnel in the highly technical positions.  The PEO is closely 
monitoring the average age of its employees, their years of experience, and their 
eligibility for retirement.  These figures are grouped based on the personnel source 
and skill level of the individual making the statistics very useful in determining trends 
and identifying risk.  In addition to these statistics, the PEO is also tracking trends in 
the replacements for those retiring.  Since January 2006, 50 personnel have been 
lost—with the group having an average age of 56, and 25 years of experience.  
Their replacements, on the other hand, have been 10 years younger and on average 
have 16 years of experience.  Our findings regarding retirement as it relates to the 
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 monitoring the trends, but can do little to manage the retirements.  On one hand, the 
average age of the workforce getting younger is a positive trend, but it is normally 
accompanied with the same trend in years of experience which may be the more 
significant metric.  
The third major issue related to the people of the organization is the impact of 
BRAC on PEO, Missiles and Space.  Similar to how aspects of the external 
environment needed to be addressed when analyzing the structure of the PEO, 
components of the BRAC must be considered when analyzing the issues 
surrounding the people of the PEO.  Although BRAC is an external political factor 
now, after the organizations arrive and begin drawing from the same government, 
matrix, and SETA personnel pools, they will become part of the organization.  For 
this reason, we must address relevant issues of that future time period when 
discussing the internal design factors.  For Huntsville and Redstone Arsenal, this 
latest set of realignments and closures will result in the net gain of an estimated 
9,700 jobs over the next few years.  Based on the type of organizations being moved 
into the area, similar skill sets to those required within PEO, Missiles and Space will 
be needed.  During interviews with the PEO staff, it became evident the staff did not 
believe it could compete in terms of pay grades with some of the organizations 
coming to the area.  Specifically, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had the ability 
to offer more competitive salaries—increasing the incentive for current Missiles and 
Space employees to leave the organization.  Although people are also motivated by 
factors which would make them less likely to leave PEO, Missiles and Space such 
as job satisfaction, loyalty, and the fear of the unknown, monetary reasons will lure 
some percentage of employees away.  Additionally, these new organizations will be 
drawing from the same matrix pools as the PEO. Therefore, any problems with the 
matrix will be exacerbated.  One finding relative to these issues is there appears to 
be no central management of personnel regarding the BRAC.  Although planning 
committees exist, these seem to be more facility oriented and not focused on 
potential personnel issues.  Another finding made in this area is the number of 
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 organization that are already being advertised.  During our site visit, we did a job 
search for Huntsville, Alabama. On 30 January 2007 there were 46 openings on the 
official USA Jobs website.  Of the 46 positions, 35 were for engineers and another 2 
were for physicists (Office of Personnel Management, 2007). In monitoring the 
website since that date, the technical positions being advertised have continued to 
grow.  This indicates that the people holding those technical skills may not feel the 
need to conform to the organizational norms and standards due to their high 
demand and recognition of their value to the organization.   
4. Analysis: People 
Based on the findings relative to the technical, retirement, and BRAC 
elements discussed, the skill sets of the people of the organization, their experience 
and needs must be aligned with organizational design factors.  The impact of having 
the required skilled people in an organization such as PEO, Missiles and Space is 
paramount.  The timeline required for replacing lost personnel will be compounded 
as the competition for personnel grows.  The PEO has put in place the proper 
mechanisms to track the people and the trends that motivate them.  Additionally, it 
has an aggressive strategy for addressing the personnel losses expected as a result 
of the Perfect Storm and related issues.  Overall the people of the organization are 
currently having a neutral effect on the productivity of the PEO.  As more BRAC 
organizations arrive and more personnel retire the effectiveness of the mitigation 
strategy will determine whether or not the organizational system is adversely 
affected. 
5. Findings: Tasks/Jobs 
In Chapter Two, the mission of PEO, Missiles and Space was defined and the 
responsibilities they were charged with were described.  The tasks and jobs 
associated with meeting these responsibilities is the focus of this section.  Our 
research in this area focused on determining what tasks were most directly impacted 
by the changes to the external environment discussed in Chapter Three.  
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 needed to be evaluated.  As we have discussed throughout the findings regarding 
the design factors of the model, the technical personnel, tasks and structural 
organization are the key components at risk according to the Perfect Storm.  In the 
case of tasks, the risk that will be realized first is the inability to provide effective 
oversight of the contractors developing and producing the missile systems.  In an 
environment with performance-based contracting, it is important to have the subject-
matter expertise capable of evaluating the technical approaches being taken.  As the 
technical personnel pool shrinks due to the factors previously discussed, there will 
not be sufficient personnel to accomplish these key tasks.  If this occurs, the 
programmatic elements will be out of control, and PEO, Missiles and Space will 
become much more inefficient.   
6. Analysis: Tasks/Jobs 
The changes to the external environment have done little to change the 
tasks/jobs the PEO performs.  What they have done is put in place conditions that 
could ultimately result in the inability to perform them due to the lack of qualified 
personnel available.  At this point in time, the PEO has not been significantly 
impacted.  In evaluating the mid-to-longer-term environment, the greater the loss of 
oversight over time on the developers, the greater the negative impact on the 
organization. 
7. Findings: Technology 
The technology component of the design factors refers to the processes and 
equipment used to make the organization more efficient and not to the technology 
associated with the products or outputs.  The focus of research in this area was to 
determine how PEO, Missiles and Space could offset potential personnel losses 
through the implementation of technology.  There were two primary findings that 
related to this area.  The first is that organizations, including PEO, Missiles and 
Space, normally are looking to insert technologies all of the time and not just when 
changes to the external environment necessitate their implementation.  Because of 
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 implemented.  The uses of video teleconferencing, advanced programmatics 
software, and multiple automated processes have already been implemented in 
order to gain additional efficiencies.  The second finding related to technology is that 
it is expensive in the short-run.  The insertion of technology can greatly advance the 
efficiency of a system, but it comes at a price.  If the PEO were to find a new 
technology that would enable it to achieve the same outputs with fewer personnel, it 
most likely would not be able to afford it.  The recent budgetary decisions have all 
sold the future in order to pay for today—meaning; it is unlikely that a capital 
investment that does not payoff for a few years could be implemented. 
8. Analysis: Technology 
Overall, the changes to the external environment have had no effect on the 
technology design factor, and it is unlikely that it will.  PEO, Missiles and Space can 
become more efficient by increasing the use of existing technologies, but it is 
unlikely additional technologies can be inserted at this time. 
9. Findings: Process/Subsystems 
The final design factor to be discussed is the process/subsystems.  This 
refers to the systems in place to manage budget, personnel, communications and all 
networks that link the design factors.  Although all of these areas are important, the 
focus of our efforts was on the human resources management processes.  This 
component would obviously be critical to the efficient operation of a system that was 
being challenged in terms of personnel.  Our research efforts in this area were 
focused on the internal process the PEO had in place to address how the 
organization would deal with the changes to the external environment causing 
personnel issues.  As mentioned in the strategy portion of the system direction in 
Chapter Three, PEO, Missiles and Space put in place a strategy to address the 
people of the organization.  Recognizing there are critical positions and personnel 
that must be closely managed given the impact of the initiatives addressed in the 
Perfect Storm, the PEO has put in place a robust mitigation strategy.  Central to its 
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 conducting road shows at local schools to make the students aware of the programs 
offered by the government and the universities with whom they have partnered.  The 
PEO has also addressed the issue with the matrix pools where knowledge became 
stove-piped.  In order to prevent this from occurring, a rotation plan has been put in 
place for personnel of specific pay grades and backgrounds.  This rotation plan will 
also provide the future leaders of the organization with a diverse background that 
better prepares them for those leadership roles.  Retaining personnel may be the 
most difficult element addressed in its strategic plan.  As previously mentioned, 
when discussing the impact of BRAC, the PEO does not have the ability to offer the 
financial incentives necessary to compete with other organizations.  The efforts are, 
therefore, oriented toward creating a good work environment that builds loyalty to 
the organization.  Our findings are that the PEO has put in place a solid plan, but 
how effective it is in recruiting, training, and retaining people of the organization will 
not be known for a few years.  Overall, this aspect can only have a positive effect on 
the organizational system. 
10. Analysis: Process/Subsystems 
PEO, Missiles and Space clearly understands the importance of managing its 
personnel and has put an emphasis on recruiting, training, and retaining the 
personnel qualified for the difficult to fill technical positions.  The impact on the PEO 
is a positive one; however, these efforts will most likely struggle to breakeven given 
the anticipated losses of personnel. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Earlier in this chapter, we described the external environment as a 
challenging and particularly difficult one for PEO, Missiles and Space to operate in 
as a result of some recent changes and shocks to the system.  Additionally, we 
found that through the correct identification of key success factors and effective 
setting of the systems direction, some of the adverse effects could be mitigated, 
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 have to operate more efficiently than in the past to offset the changes to the inputs.  
Based on our findings relative to the design factors of the model, this is most likely 
achievable in the short-term, but is unlikely in the mid-to-longer-term.  Many of the 
changes to the external environment have yet to have an impact on the PEO.  It will 
not be until feedback from the results section of the organizational systems model 
are processed after a period of time that the full impact of the changes will be 
known.  If the structure of the organization withstands a shrinking pool of technical 
expertise, and the effects of BRAC, retirements, and the matrix system do not result 
in the loss of institutional knowledge, then the system will continue to produce the 
required outputs in an efficient manner.  This will also mean that the mitigation 
strategy put in place by the PEO has effectively addressed the issues the strategy 
was designed to resolve.  The measure of whether or not the organization is 
producing the desired outputs will be covered next in the results section of the 
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 V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM OUTPUT 
This chapter presents the findings and analysis relevant to the results section 
of the organizational systems model.  The same format utilized in presenting the 
data for the input and throughput sections in Chapters Three and Four is followed.  
Findings relative to the culture, outputs, and outcomes is presented and an analysis 
of those findings is then conducted.  The focus of research in this area is to analyze 
short term results produced since the changes to the external environment, and the 
implementation of mitigation strategies in the design factors, and to forecast results 
in mid- to longer-term periods based on current trends.  Following the analysis of this 
final section in the organizational systems framework model, the complex 
interactions of variables surrounding PEO, Missiles and Space should be better 
understood. 
A. CULTURE 
This section analyzes how PEO, Missiles and Space has processed recent 
changes to the external environment and how the realignment of design factors has 
affected the culture of the organization.  After identifying these cultural changes, 
analysis determines whether or not they facilitate the organizations efforts to 
accomplish assigned tasks or are an impediment to accomplishing their mission.      
1. Findings: Culture 
There are two findings concerning the culture of PEO, Missiles and Space 
that relate to the strategic issues being analyzed.  The first is the results of the 
changing labor mix driven by PBD 753.  In Chapter 4, we addressed the 
government, matrix, and SETA personnel pools and their roles in the structure of the 
organization.  In an organization of approximately 1450 personnel, the elimination of 
154 positions has resulted in a 10% change in structure and a dramatic shift in the 
PEO’s composition.  With the positions lost primarily being SETA, and the remaining 
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 change in culture is taking place.  Interviews with members of the PEO’s human 
resource department revealed a growing trend of current SETA employees 
aggressively seeking government positions.  This is understandable given the 
elimination of many of these positions is planned.  As part of its strategy for retaining 
expertise and demonstrating loyalty to its personnel, the PEO has assisted SETA 
employees with the structuring of their resumes for government positions.  
Additionally, it has adjusted its personnel authorization document when possible to 
convert positions to a government core or matrix slating.  This affects the culture of 
the organization in the three ways described below.   
First, SETA employees are pressured to demonstrate their irreplaceable 
value to the organization to ensure job security.  On the positive side, this may result 
in increased effort and performance by employees attempting to demonstrate their 
worth.  On the negative side, employees may seek to show their value by hording 
knowledge in an effort to make themselves a unique and essential cog in the 
organization’s operations.  The second affect is the forming of subcultures within the 
PEO.  As the number of SETA employees decrease as a percentage of the 
workforce, they will become more and more isolated.  Despite PEO team building 
efforts, the natural division between government and SETA employees will grow.  
The final way these changes potentially affect the culture is in the loyalty to the 
organization.  If PEO, Missiles and Space is able to demonstrate loyalty to its 
employees during this time when positions are being eliminated, then it will increase 
the probability of those employees returning that loyalty.  This cultural aspect may be 
valuable when BRAC positions open and offer employees alternative employment 
options. 
The second finding relative to the cultural element is the anticipated turnover 
of PEO leadership in the summer of 2007.  Over the past two years, PEO, Missiles 
and Space has undertaken and endured changes that can greatly influence the 
culture of the organization.  After being established through the merger of two 
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 reorganized some of the subordinate Project Offices, dealt with the personnel 
impacts of PBD 753, and adjusted to additional changes in the external environment.  
Through this tumultuous time period, the leadership in the Program Executive Office 
and many of the Project Offices has remained constant providing a consistent and 
familiar guiding hand.  The norms and values of the organization have been 
established and formed around these leaders; the subordinates have developed 
formal and informal channels based on the direction they have set.  With the 
anticipated departure of the PEO BG Cannon and four of his seven Project 
Managers in the summer of 2007, these channels may or may not prove to be 
effective with the new leadership.  The fragile still-forming culture of the organization 
will be challenged, and a new direction may be taken.  Although not directly related 
to the strategic issues being addressed, the turnover of leadership and subsequent 
changes to culture will impact the organization’s approach for addressing these 
issues.  This variable and its positive or negative affect on the organization will not 
be known for some time, but their potential impact must be acknowledged. 
2. Analysis: Culture 
Our findings in this area are inconclusive.  Although two cultural impacts have 
been identified, quantifying and estimating their impact on the system is difficult to 
complete.  As these anticipated changes to PEO, Missiles and Space culture occur 
and are reflected back into the system, the effects of their change will be better 
known.    
B. OUTPUTS 
1. Findings: Outputs 
The output of PEO, Missiles and Space is more than the just the weapon 
systems it produces.  The lifecycle management of those systems, the quality of 
support provided to the warfighter, and the effectiveness of its teaming with industry 
are all outputs of the organization that must be measured.  As they relate to the 
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 findings in those areas with which we are concerned.  The PEO is responsible for 
approximately 58 systems in all possible stages of lifecycle management (Program 
Executive Office, 2007b).  The development and production of those systems is the 
first area under outputs to be covered.  Research in this area focused on directed 
changes to required outputs based on annual authorizations for the systems the 
PEO manages.  The historic funding levels and quantities of systems produced were 
taken from data available at the Office of the Director for Army Budget (Assistant 
Secretary of the Army, 2007).  The primary finding in this area is not the systems 
that have been produced, but the ones that will not be produced.  During interviews 
with the PEO staff, the researchers discovered that in order for the PEO to meet the 
efficiencies required by PBD 753, some of the funding would have to come from 
allocations previously directed for programs.  In this case, the GMLRS product line 
was identified as the source for these funds (Senior Leader, 2007).  This change in 
the outputs of the system was necessary to offset the changes in political priorities.  
The cancellation of ATACMS, APKWS, JCM and significant reductions to the 
MEADS program in the President’s Budget submitted February 2007 are further 
examples of reduced outputs for PEO, Missiles and Space necessitated by changes 
in priorities. These changes affect both short- and longer-term outputs.  The 
cancelled research and development efforts in the short-term translate to less 
production and sustainment outputs in the longer-term.  
The second area of outputs to be considered is the PEO’s support to the 
warfighter in the form of the reliability and availability of fielded weapon systems.  
Our findings in this area were mixed.  In the short-term, it appears PEO, Missiles 
and Space has been able to provide the same level and quality of support as before 
the strategic issues being discussed were identified.  No significant short-term 
issues in providing support to the warfighter were identified during the conduct of our 
interviews.  The effects of recent decisions in the mid-to-longer-term, however, are 
unclear.  During our site visit to PEO, Missiles and Space, several concerns in this 
area were raised.  Stockpile reliability was identified as one of those areas of 
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 life of the current systems will need to be extended beyond their originally planned 
lifecycles. In addition to this extension being a costly undertaking, there are also 
some challenges which will make it more difficult.  Concerns over obsolescence are 
an issue.  By extending the life of these systems, there is a chance that some of the 
technologies used in their design or in their production process will have become 
outdated and replaced.  In these cases the parts, procedures, or the knowledge 
necessary to ensure the systems reliability may no longer be available.  It is difficult 
to quantify exactly how the outputs of PEO, Missiles and Space will be affected by 
these issues in the mid-to-longer-term and whether or not the desired reliability and 
availability output levels will be reached. 
The final output area to be addressed is Foreign Military Sales (FMS).  This 
output is significant both as a means to reduce per unit cost and as an indicator of 
the perceived capability gap of US products over those of other nations.  During our 
interview with BG Cannon, he indicated PEO, Missiles and Space was experiencing 
declining trends in FMS as a result of competition from other nations.  This is 
troubling for two reasons related to the strategic issues facing the PEO.  First, FMS 
sales increase the total quantity of units produced—enabling economies of scale to 
be achieved which reduce the per unit cost of systems.  Without these sales, the 
price for each US system goes up—requiring either greater funding levels or 
reduced quantities than originally planned.  Additionally, these sales are valuable in 
managing the production flow.  FMS can be utilized to fill the gaps between 
production runs for the US inventory that allow the production lines to stay active, 
thus avoiding start-up fees associated with bringing production back on line.  The 
second reason declining FMS sales is troubling is that it signals there are other 
systems in the market that are perceived as better options than the ones being 
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Figure 9. Performance Gap is Closing  
(Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, 2007, February) 
If maintaining a capability gap and being a world leader in missile 
technologies is a required output of the organization, then declining FMS sales could 
indicate PEO, Missiles and Space is not producing its required outputs.     
2. Analysis: Outputs 
In the short-term, PEO, Missiles and Space has been able to meet its 
required outputs.  The reduction in inputs has been accompanied by corresponding 
changes to the quantities of systems produced, and the support and services 
provided to the warfighter have not been degraded.  This has resulted in a smaller, 
but still effective organization.  Analysis of the mid-to-longer-term outputs is less 
conclusive.  It is evident based on trends in the areas evaluated that the organization 
may not be able to fully meet future requirements.  The declining quantities by both 
the US and FMS customers will drive the per-unit-cost up, making it difficult to 
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 organization.  Higher costs related to the stockpile reliability and the risk in this area 
will also adversely impact the outputs beyond the short-term.  
C. OUTCOMES 
1. Findings: Outcomes 
The strategic issues identified in the Perfect Storm, and the issues related to 
them uncovered during research, are in most cases forecasts of anticipated 
outcomes of PEO, Missiles and Space.  These unintended results are by products of 
the desired outputs and indicate how the PEO is performing or expected to perform 
in regards to the changing external environment.  These outcomes are important 
because they indicate a cost to the organization’s operations; they also serve as 
inputs to the external environment as feedback loops continuously process these 
most-recent results.  There are two primary findings in this area.  The first is 
industry’s response to the Army’s decreased funding and apparent shift away from 
missile systems in the short-term.  As previously discussed in Chapter 3, industry 
takes its cues from the funding authorizations—which signal the Army’s intentions.  
The signals sent by recent Army decisions to decrease investment in missile 
technologies, cancel developmental programs, and reduce production quantities of 
existing systems are signals that the future of missiles is not a bright one.  The 
migration by engineers in critical missile technology fields into other disciplines has 
been industry’s response to these signals.  Why this is significant is that if the Army 
changes its position on missile systems and the role it is expected to play in future 
forces, the industrial base may not be able to immediately support the change in 
priorities.  The outcome in this case is the increased response time necessary to 
meet the Army’s changing needs.  This dynamic could also be classified as risk.  
The Army’s short-term shift in priorities may be acceptable—provided the risk does 
not exceed a threshold.   
The second finding under outcomes involves the personnel and strategic 
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 signals to industry, they also send signals to the workforce.  An outcome for PEO, 
Missiles and Space as a result of PBD 753 is that SETA employee positions are in 
jeopardy and do not offer the same level of stability as in the past.  This fact may 
persuade potential workers who value stability to take job opportunities with other 
organizations.  This, in turn, will limit the potential employee pool and require the 
PEO to offer greater incentives to attract those who would otherwise be unwilling to 
take a job without the prospect of long-term employment. 
2. Analysis: Outcomes 
The two short-term outcomes identified above indicate the first signs of larger 
problems that PEO, Missiles and Space may face in the mid-to-longer-term.  These 
initial findings validate, at least to a certain extent, the technical base and personnel 
arguments made in the PEO’s recent strategic arguments.  Although the impact of 
these outcomes does not threaten the PEO’s ability to meet short-term outputs, they 
do represent a threat to their ability to meet requirements in years to come.   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
There has been limited data in the form of results (culture, outputs and 
outcomes) produced by PEO, Missiles and Space since the identification of the 
Perfect Storm issues.  Those which have been observed are just now feeding back 
into the organization and will likely drive future changes.  Based on the results to 
date, it appears in the short-term the PEO has been able to meet required outputs 
and limit negative outcomes.  The more troubling component in this analysis is that 
the initial indicators for the larger strategic issues warned of in the Perfect Storm and 
industrial base arguments made by the PEO appear to be present.  The outcomes of 
decreased funding for research and development have already been processed by 
industry and their answer has been to move away from missile-related technologies.  
Personnel issues, specifically in the more technical positions, have not been realized 
to date; but the trends indicate problems may exist in the mid-to-longer-term.  How 
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 subsequently used to shape the external environment will determine the future 
success or failure of PEO, Missiles and Space.           
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents four overarching conclusions and recommendations 
resulting from an analysis of strategic issues facing PEO, Missiles and Space 
primarily over a mid-term timeframe (five years out).  Senior executives composed 
and forwarded a strategic issues document which described the basics of four 
interrelated personnel, retirement and financial problem areas.  This study collected 
data relative to these issues primarily through the use of semi-structured interviews 
conducted with approximately 12 officer and relevant civilian personnel.  The 
benefits of this study include validating personnel concerns in the technical missile 
fields and, the identification of trends linking Army prioritizations with corresponding 
actions in industry.  Recommendations are made suggesting possible alternatives 
for abating the vicious downward spiral missile technologies have entered into as a 
result of declining investment in development.  This spiral and decline in the missile 
industry eventually generates an institutional loss of knowledge, thereby decreasing 
core capability in the missile arena and possibly degrading the development of future 
missile warfighting systems.  The four conclusions are:   
B. CONCLUSION ONE 
PEO, Missiles and Space has formulated and is implementing an array 
of initiatives which are having a short-term positive effect in terms of 
mitigating and anticipating the effects of four interrelated issues initially 
outlined in the Perfect Storm. 
Those initiatives are 1) Partnering with local universities, 2) Students Working 
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 employment opportunities within the DoD, 4) Establishment of the Missile Systems 
Engineering Degree offered at University of Alabama, Huntsville, and 5) 
Implementation of the strategic workforce transformation plan.  The current 
organization, operating procedures, and resourcing levels are capable of meeting 
required short-term outputs.  Despite reduced funding in the most recent President’s 
Budget and the continuing effects of cost efficiencies mandated by PBD 753, the 
organization appears in balance and capable of meeting directed requirements 
outlined in the most recent POM.  The reduction in resources has been offset by 
efficiencies gained in the organization and through reductions in required outputs—
specifically, the elimination of the APKWS, JCM, ATACMS programs, and significant 
reductions to the MEADS program. 
Recommendations  
PEO, Missiles and Space continue to reevaluate programs and assess 
changes to resourcing levels and requirements.  The reinstatement of an eliminated 
program without sufficient resourcing could put the organization into an imbalanced 
state that adversely affects not only the reinstated program, but the other programs 
within the PEO. 
PEO should identify and retain the critical technical personnel from the four 
programs that have been eliminated/reduced to ensure core technical capability 
resides within PEO, particularly during the next two to five years, which still contain 
uncertainty. Although carrying these personnel will come at a cost to the 
organization, the expertise of these limited resources may be necessary to offset 
any unanticipated rapid changes in the personnel structure as a result of BRAC and 
retirements.   
C. CONCLUSION TWO 
In the mid-to-longer time frame (five years out) PEO, Missiles and Space 
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 workforce capable of handling future requirements, particularly in the low-
density technical positions. 
This gap is primarily a result of both a lag in achieving newly initiated 
programs and mitigation measures, and an unclear future ability to hire, grow and 
retain technical-oriented personnel.  Initiatives implemented by PEO, Missiles and 
Space to mitigate the looming personnel crisis identified in the Perfect Storm are not 
likely to fully alleviate the human resource problems central to this strategic issue.  
As discussed in Conclusion 1, balance is projected for the short-term; however, this 
balance does not appear to be maintainable into the mid- and long-term periods 
given current trends.  The initiatives implemented by PEO, Missiles and Space to 
attract, train, and retain the next generation of missile system developers will be 
successful in the less technical positions with fewer educational and training 
requirements.  For the positions requiring longer lead times to produce a productive 
employee, it appears there will be a three-to-four-year gap where these initiatives 
will not yet be producing the quantities of technical personnel required to offset 
losses to retirement and BRAC organizations. 
Recommendations 
Continue and expand upon the stated initiatives already implemented to 
attract, train, and retain personnel. Without these efforts, the organization will 
become less efficient and require a greater number of resources to meet the 
required outputs of the organization.    
Seek relief from SETA hiring constraints until the expertise required has been 
grown within the core and matrix personnel pools.  Failure to do this will result in a 
break in continuity and the loss of institutional knowledge critical to the efficient 
running and balance of the organization. 
Should the current trends in reduced funding for RDT&E efforts and the 
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 need to reduce excess capability (people and facilities).  A revamped structure 
would focus on the technical expertise needed to support already-fielded systems 
(and their modifications), and would considerably reduce all RDT&E requirements—
i.e., perhaps by 90 percent.  The current organization has been optimized based on 
the need for each Project Office to support systems in all phases of the lifecycle.  
The recent cancellation of programs and developmental efforts in Project Offices 
eliminates the need for the capability to be maintained in the majority of the Project 
Offices.  Restructuring based on these trends would be advisable if the trends are 
expected to continue. 
D. CONCLUSION THREE 
The strategy of using “white papers” to raise attention and support for 
emerging and continuing PEO issues—although manageable in the short-
term— appears to be inadequate to solve mid- and longer-term anticipated 
consequences. 
Recommendations 
PEO, Missiles and Space must gain the backing of the four supported BOS 
elements and the missile development industry to effectively address these issues.  
Formalize the current informal and ad hoc process of meeting and collaborating with 
all relevant stakeholders, i.e., form a stakeholder task force with sufficient power to 
influence more powerful stakeholders.  This should be established to address 
current and future missile-related issues.  This unified voice is required to compete 
for resources on a level playing field with organizations that by design or through 
their scope have a more centralized and focused effort.   
=
=
Formalize a process for managing personnel inflows and outflows base-wide 
to ensure rational, equitable, and timely transitions of multiple streams of personnel, 
i.e., a central honest-broker, clearing-house. A neutral party must be appointed to 
oversee the personnel aspects of the transition of BRAC elements to Redstone 
Arsenal.  There appears to be no higher echelon involvement in ensuring current 
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 and transitioning organizations competition for personnel, particularly from matrix 
pools, does not result in an element becoming dysfunctional.  This neutral party 
should be tasked with resolving personnel concerns of all stakeholders and be 
empowered to make decisions regarding these matters.  
E. CONCLUSION FOUR 
Cancellation of programs and reduced funding streams (e.g., RDT&E) 
have contributed to a vicious spiral. To the extent that the missile industry 
loses profitability and atrophies, a commensurate loss in institutional 
knowledge will likely occur, eventually adversely affecting missile warfighting 
capability in the field. 
Decisions and anticipated personnel issues in missile-related technical 
positions have put the future of Army missile systems at risk.  Intentionally or 
unintentionally, the combined effect of recent decisions has initiated a sequence of 
events that points toward a time when missile technologies will not be an integral 
part of military doctrine.  Based on the actions industry has already taken in 
response to the Army’s declining investment in future missile technologies, the 
expertise in this field will soon be lost unless signals are sent indicating this trend is 
not indicative of the future role of missiles in the force.  The longer that decision-
makers delay in terms of solving this macro problem, the more difficult intervention 




Develop and present a detailed cost benefit analysis representing the risk 
associated with continued flat or declining investments in missile technologies.  This 
analysis should include the estimated cost over time associated with delaying action 
and, subsequently, resulting in the need to rebuild this segment of the industrial 
base.  Scenario analysis might also prove to be a useful tool in terms of quantifying 
the effects of degradation in US Army missile efforts, compared to several key 
adversaries. 
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 Identify a mid- and long-term strategy for retaining personnel with critical 
missile experience.  Based on current trends the pool of subject matter experts in 
the technical areas will continue to shrink.  Even if trends are not reversed and there 
is no anticipated future for missile systems, the current inventory will need to be 
sustained until the end of its lifecycle.  In order to provide sufficient oversight of the 
support contracted to provide this sustainment, the government will need to retain 
skilled personnel.  Incentives comparable with those offered by industry will be 
necessary unless other retention mechanisms are employed. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The conclusions above were made based on the facts and perceptions 
available at the time of this project.  Many of the variables discussed are not 
anticipated to have an identifiable impact on PEO, Missiles and Space for several 
years out.  As more time passes from the completion of this project and the 
assumptions and estimates these conclusions were based on are replaced by actual 
data points, more accurate recommendations can be made.   
Further research and analysis of the technical aspects beyond the scope of 
this project will also reveal more concrete recommendations regarding the industrial 
base and the risks identified in this report.  Additionally, we recommend follow-on 
research efforts focus on the industry and user communities perspectives of the 
issues analyzed in this project.  Specifically, determining industries ability to respond 
to changes in the direction of missile development, and the using communities’ 
expectations of missiles systems in future forces would complement the efforts of 
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 APPENDIX A. SEMI-STRUCTURED RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
BACKGROUND 
1. PEO, Missiles and Space consists of 1,447 personnel.   
a. Which TDA is this based on? 
b. How many of the positions are in the technical areas of concern?  
2. Military specific technology areas listed as % of base on slide 10.  
a. What is the “base”? 
b. What does the reference to ~1000 lost man years represent? 
PBD 
1. PBD 753 requires $360 million in efficiencies from FY 06-11.   
2. How these efficiencies gained briefed to Army Staff in April 2005.     
a. Where is this brief? 
3. PEO is to eliminate approximately 300 support contractor jobs between FY 
07-09 with the intent of eliminating 100/year.   
a. What is the status of this effort? 
b. How many support contractors are currently on the payroll? 
MATRIX 
1. Matrix support has deteriorated since 1989/90.  
a. Massive downsizing is based on personnel figures. 
2. Part of strategy to meet PBD is to return matrix support.   
a. How many over the effected timeframe? 
b. Returning personnel to matrix-parent organizations is difficult because 
they have been charged with efficiencies as well.  What efficiencies? 
3. PEOs have rehired matrix personnel back into the organization to maintain 
required skill sets.   
a. What numbers support this, and how were they obtained? 
b. Has there been a gap created since the hiring freeze? 
RETIREMENT 
1. 50% of the workforce eligible to retire by FY-08 and 80% by FY-10.   
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 b. How have these figures changed since the white paper? 
2. Current trends suggest 30-50% of those eligible will retire.  
a. What does that translate into as far as total numbers? 
b. Are the percentages different by division or organization? 
3. Low estimate of 250 personnel retiring by FY 10.  
a. Are these all vacancies or will some be backfilled? 
b. How many openings with unfilled requisitions are there at present? 
4. As of brief, 57% of AMCOM workforce over 50 years old?  
a. What are these figures in the technical positions? 
5. Multiple figures on slides 8 and 9 of brief concerning retirement.  
a. What do these numbers represent in terms of issues?  
BRAC 
1. Approximately 4,700 government and 5,000 support contractor jobs will be 
moving to the RSA area.   
a. What is the source of this data? 
b. How many of these positions are in the technical areas? 
2. 30-65% of personnel will not move to RSA creating vacancies.   
a. Source of data? 
b. What historically is known about the technical positions? 
3. Influx begins in FY 07 and continues through FY-11. 
a. What is the “master plan” for BRAC? 
b. Who controls timetables? 
c. Arriving units would seem to be more concerned about their ability to 
fill required technical positions.  What are their concerns, and have 
they raised any issues to the DA level? 
4. AMC, MDA, and SMDC are relocating to Huntsville and have similar required 
skills.   
a. What are the TDAs of these organizations? 
b. Are there any BRAC losses that will decrease personnel 
requirements?  
IMPACT 
1. Slide #3 illustrates three areas over the FY 08-10 timeframe that apparently 
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 a. What is/are the point(s) of this slide? 
2. Since January 2006 (to time of brief) 50 personnel had been lost to 
retirement/reassignment/resignation, and 25 personnel had been hired. (B) 
a. What positions are the 25 vacancies and how many (if any) were 
intentionally not filled?  
3. Average age and years of experience of personnel hired were 10 and 9 years 
less than those lost.  
a. Is this a good- or bad-news story? 
b. Has there been any noticeable performance impact of these changes? 
4. Strategic plan referenced on slide 11 with multiple components.   
a. What is the detail or objectives for each of these components? 
b. How successful have these efforts been to date? 
SYSTEMS MODEL INPUTS 
1. Environment/Context 
a. Political 
i. What are the challenges of balancing Perfect Storm and 
BRAC arguments? 
ii. What are the perceived points of conflict with the arguments 
and who is making them? 
iii. What are the actual differences? 
iv. Will changes in control of the HASC/SASC/HAC/SAC have 
any significant impact? 
v. Other? 
b. Economic 
i. How would you characterize the strength of the defense 
industrial base today in economic terms as it relates to PEO, 
Missiles and Space? 
ii. How is the industrial base interpreting funding decisions 
such as PBD 753? 
iii. How does the current competition for resources compare to 
that of the recent past? 
iv. Other? 
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 i. What impact has the decision had on the SETA and Matrix 
employees’ sense of being integral members of the PEO, 
contributing to the organization accomplishing its mission? 
ii. How have these decisions affected the Core members of the 
PEO? 
iii. What social issues (if any) from the merger are still present?  
iv. Other? 
d. Technological 
i. How would you characterize the pace at which the Missiles 
and Space industry is presently evolving? 
ii. What training is necessary to remain abreast of the 
technological advances in the fields? 
iii. What do the ideal and typical career paths for the 
technological fields look like? 
iv. How important is understanding a particular system to 
general technological expertise? 
 
2. Key Success Factors 
a. Given the political/economic/social/technological environment 
identified above, what has PEO, Missiles and Space identified as 
the critical elements in accomplishing their mission? 
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